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ABSTRACT
Three Theories of Events
Edward R. Wierenga
University of Massachusetts at Amherst
Director: Gareth B. Matthews
August, 1974
This dissertation is an examination of the theories of
events proposed by Jaegwon Kim, Donald Davidson, and Roderick
Chisholm.
In the first chapter I consider Kim's view that an event
is the having of an n-adic property by an n-ary sequence of
objects at a time. I show how Kim can coherently reply to a
familiar trivialization argument whose conclusion is that
there is only one event. I argue that Kim's view is vague
in certain crucial respects and that it involves an objectiona-
ble brand of essentialism.
Since Davidson attempts to support his theory of events
by appeal to his analysis of the logical form of action
sentences, I devote two chapters to that analysis. In Chapter
II I state Davidson's view that action sentences are ex-
istential quantifications over events and that many adverbial
modifiers are predicates of events. I show how Davidson's
theory can avoid an objection of Fodor's that it cannot ac
commodate those modifiers that function both as sentential
modifiers and verbal modifiers. In Chapter III I claim that
VDavidson’s account of action sentences is defective because
it cannot handle certain cases in which an agent does two
things at once. I consider a revision of Davidson's theory
designed to avoid this objection, but conclude for similar
reasons that the revision is also defective.
In Chapter IV I consider Davidson's theory of events.
There are two important features of his theory: events are
concrete particulars and they are extremely coarsely in-
dividuated. I consider mainly the second. I claim that
neither the positive support he provides for his theory , nor
the identity condition he gives for events, nor his account
of action sentences requires that events are coarsely in-
dividuated. I consider an objection to Davidson, urged by
Goldman, that certain events which Davidson identifies occur
at different times, but I find the objection inconclusive.
I consider another objection that events which Davidson
identifies occur at different places, and find it more
persuasive. I also note that Davidson's view of events is
incompatible with a natural treatment of sentences like 'He
opened the window by turning the crank’. Finally, in an
appendix, I criticize Davidson's attempt to explain his
talk
of actions "under a description".
In the fifth chapter I examine Chisholm's view that
events are a species of states of affairs. I
consider some
objections to which Chisholm is able to reply. I claim,
Chisholm's theory does not do justice to ourhowever, that
VI
ordinary notion of event, and, in particular, he has given
no method for counting events. Moreover, although he has
given a theory which allows for events that occur at some
times and which fail to occur at others, he seems to ignore
the possibility that an event may occur at some place while
failing to occur at another. This possibility is exploited
to reveal an ambiguity in Chisholm's primitive locution,
'pBc^', read 'jd occurs before begins'. A similar considera-
tion reveals a defect in a series of definitions by which
Chisholm tried to reduce talk of particular occurrences of
events to talk only of the occurrence and non-occurrence of
his generic events.
In a brief conclusion I review some motivations which
have led philosophers to suppose that there are events,
and I list some problems which an adequate theory of events
ought to solve. I conclude that none of the three theories
examined is acceptable.
Vll
PREFACE
This dissertation is an examination of the theories of
events proposed by Jaegwon Kim, Donald Davidson, and Roderick
Chisholm. These theories were not chosen because they are
the only currently available theories of events. On the
contrary, there are several alternatives . 1 Rather, these
theories were chosen because they interested me and because,
in virtue of their differences , they represent a wide
variety of alternatives
.
There is a pair of distinctions made with respect to
events. First, events might be thought to be concrete
particulars or they might be thought to be some sort of
abstract entities. Secondly, some philosophers argue
that events are very finely individuated, while others
2
conceive of events as very coarsely individuated. The
three theories to be considered cut across this pair of
distinctions in an interesting way. According to Kim
events are particular and finely individuated. According
to Davidson events are particular but coarsely individuated.
And according to Chisholm they are abstract and finely
individuated
.
In the first chapter I shall discuss Kim's theory of
events. I shall first state and develop his view that an
event is the having of an n-adic property by an n-ary
sequence of objects at a time. Next, I shall consider a
claim made by F. Robert Bohl, Jr., that anyone who
accepts,
Vlll
as Kim does, that sentences refer to or describe events
is committed to the premisses of an argument whose con-
clusion is that there is only one event. I shall claim
that Kim can coherently reject some of the premisses of
this trivialization argument. Finally, I shall offer
some criticisms of Kim's theory. I shall claim that it
is vague in certain crucial respects , that it leaves
several important questions unanswered. I shall also
claim that Kim's view might involve an objectionable
brand of essentialism. It seems to be his view, for
example, that an event cannot occur at any time other
than the time at which it does occur.
Since Davidson attempts to support his theory of
events by appealing to his analysis of the logical form
of action sentences
,
I shall devote two chapters to that
analysis. In Chapter II I shall present Davidson's view
that sentences like
(1) Boris strolled in Bologna
are existential generalizations over events, and that
many adverbial phrases, like 'in Bologna' are predicates
of events. I shall consider an objection due to Fodor
that this account cannot handle adverbial modifiers that
function both as sentential modifiers and verbal modifiers,
and I shall show how Davidson can meet this objection.
In Chapter III I shall claim that Davidson's treat-
ment of action sentences cannot account for certain
cases
in which an agent does two things at once. I
shall consider
IX
a revision of Davidson's theory designed to avoid this
objection, but I shall conclude that similar considerations
show the revision to be inadequate.
In the fourth chapter I shall consider Davidson's
theory of events. As noted above, there are two salient
features of Davidson's theory of events. First, he thinks
that events are particular. Secondly, he thinks that
events are coarsely individuated, that, for example, an
agent's flipping a light switch might be the same event
as his illuminating the room. I shall be mainly concerned
' 4
with this second feature of Davidson's theory of events.
And I shall argue, first, that it is not supported by the
considerations Davidson adduces in its favor. Moreover,
fine-grained event individuation , I shall argue , is not
supported either by Davidson's account of action sentences
or by the identity condition he gives for events
.
I shall also consider some objections to Davidson's
theory of events. The first, due to Goldman, is that
certain events which Davidson identifies occur at dif-
ferent times. While I am sympathetic to this objection,
I shall conclude that the unattractiveness of alternative
attempts to fix the time of the occurrence of the
events
in question makes the objection unpersuasive. Another
objection that I shall consider is that some events which
Davidson identifies occur at different places. I
shall
also note that Davidson's view of events is
incompatible
Xwith a natural treatment of sentences like, 'He opened
the window by turning the crank'. Finally, in an appendix
to the fourth chapter, I shall criticize Davidson's attempt
to explain his talk of actions "under a description".
In Chapter V I shall discuss Chisholm’s theory that
events are a species of states of affairs. A state of
affairs, for Chisholm, is anything capable of being the
object of a propositional attitude. An event is a state
of affairs that can recur, that is, it can occur and then
occur again after not occuring. Chisholm thinks that we
can reduce talk of particular occurences of events to
talk only of the occurrence or non-occurrence of his
generic events . I shall claim that Chisholm fails to do
justice to our ordinary concept of event. Chisholm's
theory is designed to accommodate events which occur at
some times and fail to occur at others. I shall note that
his events might occur at one place while failing to occur
at some other place. I shall exploit this possibility to
point out an ambiguity in his primitive locution 'pBq'
,
read ’p occurs before q begins ' . The same possibility
will be used to show that a series of definitions by which
Chisholm hopes to accomplish the reduction of talk about
particular events to talk only of generic events is
defective
.
In a concluding chapter I shall review some of the
motivations which have led philosophers to think that
there
XI
are events. I shall also list some problems which any
adequate theory of events ought to solve. I shall claim
that none of the three theories considered has acceptable
solutions to all of these problems. For this reason, and
on the basis of the specific criticisms developed in
earlier chapters
,
I shall conclude that none of the three
theories is at present acceptable.
I would like to express my appreciation to the
members of my committee, Professors Gareth B. Matthews,
Fred Feldman, and Terence Parsons, for their care in
reading earlier versions of this dissertation and for
their helpfulness in suggesting improvements. I
would also like to express my appreciation to my wife
for much encouragement
.
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Notes to the Preface
^We might mention a few authors: Montague, "On the
Nature of Certain Philosophical Entities" Monist 53 (1969):
159-194; Rescher, "Aspects of Action" Appendix II of Rescher,
ed., The Logic of Decision and Action (Pittsburgh, 1966)
:
215-219; von Wright, "The Logic of Action - - A Sketch"
in Rescher, op. cit .
,
121-136; R.M . Martin, "On Events and
Their Descriptions" in Margolis , ed., Fact and Existence
(Oxford, 1969): 63-74; Goldman, "Individuation of Action"
Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971) : 761-774 , and A Theory
of Human Action (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1970). Incidentally,
the theories of Martin and Goldman are quite similar to Kim's
view
.
2Actually
,
I think that the second distinction is more
properly thought of as a continuum. Aside from a brief
remark in the conclusion, however, I do not consider al-
ternatives between extreme fine-grained and extreme coarse-
grained approaches to event individuation. Also, I have
some reservations as to whether the first distinction can
be clearly drawn. See Chapter VI, note 27. The remarks
of this paragraph should be taken as introductory and
superficial
.
3He prefers the word ‘generic'.
^The first feature, that events are particular, is
treated implicitly to the following extent. Since
Davidson's account of action sentences quantifies
over
Xlll
particular events , that account would provide a reason
for embracing particular events, if it were acceptable.
But, as I shall argue in Chapter III, it is unacceptable.
Thus
,
the view that events are particular is not supported
in at least one way in which Davidson thinks that it is.
XIV
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CHAPTER I
KIM ON EVENTS
In a recent series of articles, Jaegwon Kim has developed
an increasingly detailed and elegant theory of events. 1 Kim's
proposals have been motivated by a desire to clarify the onto-
logical issues underlying discussion of causation and ex-
planation. Thus, his theory is primarily an attempt to analyse
those entities which are the objects of explanation and the
2
relata of the relation of causation. Of particular interest
are his claim that events are structured and his adoption of
a canonical notation to make explicit that structure.
This chapter is divided into three parts. In the first
section I shall briefly present Kim's theory. In the second
section I shall consider an argument to the effect that Kim's
theory has the consequence that there is only one event.
Finally, I shall offer some criticisms of the theory.
1. Kim' s View . On Kim's view, an event is a complex
which consists in an object (or n-tuple of objects) ex-
emplifying a property (or n-adic relation) at an instant or
3
during an interval of time. In monadic cases, an event is
simply the having of a property by a thing at a time. To
refer to events, Kim introduces the notation ' [ (x, t)
,
P]
'
,
where x is the constitutive object of the event, P is the
constitutive property, and t is the constitutive time.
' [(x,t), P]
'
is read as 'the having of P by x at t . ^ince
be the having of a property by an object,Kim takes events to
2his notion of 'event' is very broad, encompassing things which
might ordinarily be thought of as states, states of affairs,
or conditions.
^
In the case of monadic events, there is a fairly straight-
forward condition of event identity:
I,: The event [(x,t), P] is identical to the event
[ (y_,
t
' ) , Q] if and only if x=y_, t=t ' , and P=Q.
Thus, Socrates' drinking hemlock is the same event as Xantippe's
husband's drinking hemlock. But, Socrates' dying is distinct
from Xantippe's becoming a widow, for although the times at
which these two events occur are identical, the respective
constitutive objects and constitutive properties are distinct.
This seems to accord with intuition, since Socrates' dying
occurred in prison, while Xantippe's becoming a widow, if it
occurred anywhere, presumably occurred wherever she was at the
time of Socrate's death.
Kim's treatment of events in which the constitutive
5
attribute is a relation is slightly more complicated. First,
Kim abbreviates the n-tuple ' (^ / *** /
—
n^ ' aS '
^~n^
'
an<^
' (
x-j^ , . . . ,xR ,
t) ' is abbreviated as ' (xn ,t) . The
canonical
notation can then accommodate events involving relations, as
illustrated in the following condition of event existence.
Existence condition: P ] exists if and only
if the n-tuple of concrete objects (x ) exemplifies
the n-adic empirical attribute P at time t.
Kim notes that his notation is not to be taken as denoting
a
triple. The triple (x_.t,P
n
) exists if (xj
,
t, and P
n
exist.
3By contrast
,
the event [(x,
n
,t), Pn ] exists, according to the
existence condition, only if (x ) satisfies Pn at t.«n —
To the objection that his theory is committed to the
position that [ (Brutus, t) stabs Caesar] is distinct from
[(Brutus, Caesar, t), stabs], Kim replies that "mixed universals"
such as stabbing Caesar are not admissible as constitutive
attributes of events. Rather, only "pure universals" are
\
6
allowed to be constituents of events. Kim does admit that
the dyadic events [(Brutus, Caesar, t)
,
stabs] and [(Caesar,
Brutus, t) is stabbed by] are identical. To account for
this, Kim states an identity condition for dyadic events
which has the requisite identity as a consequence. First,
Kim defines for any dyadic relation R, a relation R* which
is its converse. Then:
I 9 : ), R]= [ (u,v,t' )
,
Q] if and only if either
(i) (x,y)=(u,v), t=t
'
,
and R=Q
,
or (ii) (x,y)
=
(v,u)
,
t=t', and R=Q*.
To generalize I2 to handle n-adic events, Kim attempts to
generalize the notion of converse. He notes that any n- tuple
can be permuted in n! ways. Where k is a scheme of permutation
on sequences of length n, Kim writes ' k(xn )
'
to denote the
result of permuting (x^) by li* Moreover, for each permutation
k, there is an inverse k~^ such that k (k (xn ) ) = (xn ) . Kim
then introduces a generalized notioa of converse as follows:
If k is a
an n-adic
such that,
if k - 1 (xn )
permutation on n—termed sequences and R is
relation, k(R) is to be the n—adic relation
for every ($n ) , (xn ) has k(R) if and only
has R. It follows that, for each k, k(xn )
4has k (R) if and only if (x ) has R. The n! permutations
of an n-adic relation R can be thought of as the converses
of R. 8
With this generalized notion of converse in hand, Kim gives
a general condition for event identity.
I
n
: t(2$n't, p ]= [ if and onlY if there
exists a permutation k on n-termed sequences
such that (xn ) =k(ym ) t t=t
1
,
and P=k (Q)
.
Thus, [(Agnes, the tin drum, Oskar, t)
,
x gives to zj=[(the
tin drum, Agnes, Oskar, t) x is given by £ to z_] , since there
is a permutation- -the one that switches the first two members
of a triple--from which the constitutive sequence mentioned
by the event description on the left of the identity sign is
transformed into the sequence mentioned by the event description
on the right.
Kim thinks that a chief merit of his account of events is
that on his theory events are structures. The structure of
events corresponds, according to Kim, to the grammatical
structure of those sentences which refer to events. Thus, a
salient feature of Kim's analysis is that sentences or state-
ments 9 refer to, describe, represent, or specify events. Al-
though Kim frequently uses the word 'refer' to characterize
the relation holding between event-describing statements and
events, I think he is most plausibly construed as intending
some special relation, distinct from the familiar relation of
referring. Not all sentences describe events, however. Kim
Generally speaking, the class of statements in question
can be delineated very roughly by saying that they
says
,
5attribute an empirical property (or relation) to a
concrete object (or ordered set of objects) at a time.
And we assume that for each event-describing statement
there is some unique event specified or described by
it 10
2. The Trivialization Argument . The notion that sentences
refer to events, together with two natural assumptions, seems
to lead, via a familiar argument, to the conclusion that there
is only one event. Recall that on Kim's view the event of
Socrates' dying is the same as Xantippe ' s husband's dying.
As Kim would put it, 'Socrates died' and ' Xantippe 's husband
died' describe the same event. A natural conclusion to draw
from this is that the replacement of co-designative singular
terms in an event-describing statement preserves the identity
of the event referred to, that is,
C) If a statement S' is obtained from a statement S
by replacing any referring expression in S by a
co-referential expression, then if S is event-
describing, S and S' describe the same event.
Similarly, we have seen that Kim wants to identify the events
described by 'Brutus stabbed Caesar' and 'Caesar was stabbed
by Brutus'. This identification is not sanctioned by (C) .
It is justified, however, by the equally plausible (L)
:
L) Logically equivalent statements describe the same
event .
H
But now (C) and (L) generate the following argument. Let p
and q be any event-describing statements which agree
in truth
value. Consider,
1) P
2) £x lx= A & pj = \ /\\
63) \x\x= K & q\ = \l\\
4) q.
(1) and (2) describe the same event, according to (L)
,
since
they are logically equivalent. Moreover, since p and q agree
in truth value, £x|x=A & = $xlx=A & qj ; and thus, according
to (C)
, (2) and (3) describe the same event. Finally, since
(3) is logically equivalent to (4)
,
(L) has it that they
describe the same event. Since no false statement describes
an event, Kim adds, all true event-describing statements seem
. 12to describe the same event.
Kim responds to this argument by considering the two
principles (L) and (C) . He notes that the subject-predicate,
grammatical structure of an event-describing statement is
reflected in the structure of the event described. Further-
more, he has loosely defined event-describing statements as
those which attribute a property (or relation) to an object
(or sequence of objects) at a time. But not all statements
logically equivalent to event-describing statements have the
right structure or attribute an empirical property to an ob-
ject, and thus, are not themselves event-describing. In
particular, Kim suggests that while 'Socrates drank hemlock 1
is event-describing, ' ^x|x=A& Socrates drank hemlock £ = \ aV
is not. Rather, "the second statement affirms a certain set-
theoretic fact which obtains if and only if the event described
by the first exists; but it does not describe, refer to, or
specify any event. Thus, at the least, (L) should be
7restricted to event-describing statements. And if this
restriction is adopted, it does not follow that (1) and (2)
describe the same event. So, the argument is blocked.
However, even restricted to event-describing statements,
(L) is not without its problems. For Kim thinks that
Xantippe ' s husband's dying and Xantippe 1 s becoming a widow
are distinct events, even though ' Xantippe 's husband died'
and 'Xantippe became a widow' are logically equivalent. Kim
argues that these events are distinct, for the former occurred
in the prison where Socrates drank the hemlock, while the
latter— if it makes sense to say where it occurred—occurred
where Xantippe was, which was not in the prison. Kim further
notes that the two statements ascribe different properties
to different individuals, and thus, by (I n ) , ought to be
construed as referring to distinct events. What is puzzling
about this example is why Kim thinks that the two statements
are logically equivalent. If ' Xantippe ' s husband' is a rigid
designator for Socrates, there is no reason at all to think
that the two statements are logically equivalent. For,
Xantippe ' s husband, that is, Socrates, could have died even
had Xantippe never married. In such a case, 'Xantippe'
s
husband died' would have been true and 'Xantippe became a
widow' false. So, perhaps ' Xantippe 's husband' should be
understood non-rigidly, that is, as picking out in each world
whoever happens to be Xantippe ' s husband in that world (if
there is exactly one such person) . Suppose Xantippe predeceases
8her husband
. Then clearly it would not be true that at her
husband's death Xantippe becomes a widow. But is it also
clear that
' Xantippe 's husband dies' would be false? I
think not. Perhaps if Xantippe had predeceased her husband
by a considerable amount of time, and if he had subsequently
remarried, we would be reluctant to say near the end of his
life that he has the property of being married to Xantippe
(although we would admit then that he has the property of
having been married to Xantippe) . But this is not a reason
\
for thinking that in such a case ' Xantippe ' s husband died'
is false at and after the death of her husband. Anyway, it
is possible that Xantippe and her husband die simultaneously,
and in this case surely 'Xantippe became a widow* is false
while ' Xantippe ' s husband died' is true. Thus I conclude
that the example of these events does not provide an ex-
ception to (L) restricted to event-describing statements.
Kim has another putative counter-example to (L) restricted
to event-describing statements. He suggests that
5) Wilbur married Edith, and
6) Edith married Wilbur
are logically equivalent, although they describe different
events. Kim's reason for thinking that (5) and (6) describe
different events is that what explains why Wilbur married
Edith need not explain why Edith married Wilbur. Are there
two events here? We might think that on Kim's view (5) and
9(6) describe, respectively,
7) [(Wilbur, t ) , marries Edith], and
8) [(Edith, t ) , marries Wilbur],
But marries Edith is surely a "mixed universal" 14 and is thus
inadmissible as a constitutive property. The same remark
holds for marries Wilbur
,
so (7) and (8) are not events, after
all. We might think then that (5) and (6) describe
\
9) [(Wilbur, Edith, t ) , marries], and
10) [(Edith, Wilbur, t ) , marries].
But now note that since the relation denoted by 'x marries y_'
is symmetric, all of its converses are identical. Also, there
is a permutation on ordered pairs which transforms (Wilbur,
Edith) into (Edith, Wilbur) and has associated with it a
converse of the relation marries . Thus, by (I n ) , (9) and (10)
refer to the same event. So Kim has not given us a case in
which, according to his own theory, (L) restricted to event-
describing statements fails.
In a footnote Kim suggests that it might be argued that
the apparent explanatory and causal asymmetry between (5)
and (6) results from understanding those sentences as
11) Wilbur intentionally marries Edith, and
12) Edith intentionally marries Wilbur,
respectively. But these two are not logically equivalent.
Accordingly, Kim suggests modifying the example to
13) Wilbur intentionally marries Edith who intentionally
marries him.
14) Edith intentionally marries Wilbur who intentionally
marries her.
10
Now (13) and (14) seem to be logically equivalent. But do
they describe different events? How would they translate
into Kim's canonical notation? If we let 'M' abbreviate
'intentionally marries', 'w' abbreviate 'Wilbur', and 'e'
abbreviate 'Edith', (13) and (14) can be written as
13
' ) wMe & eMw
14 ' ) eMw & wMe
Now we can define a predicate 'W' as
15) xWy_ =df xM£ & yMx.
In terms of these abbreviations, then, (13) and (14) really
amount, respectively, to
13'') wWe
14'') eWw
.
In that case, the events described by (13) and (14) seem to
be given, respectively, by
16) [(w, e, t), xWy ] , and
17) [ (e , w, t) , xWy ]
.
But, as in the earlier case, there is a permutation, k, on
ordered pairs which transforms (w,e) into (e,w) , and ' xWy_'
denotes a relation which any pair (x,y_) exemplifies just in
case k-l(x,£), that is, (£,x) , exemplifies xWy;. This last
follows from the fact that xWy_ is symmetric. But then by (I n ) t
(16) and (17) describe the same event. So again I conclude
that Kim has not provided us with an exception to (L)
14
restricted to event-describing statements.
Does it follow that no two logically equivalent event-
11
describing statements refer to different events? I think
not. Consider,
18) Jones constructs an equiangular triangle, and
19) Jones constructs an equilateral triangle.
Clearly, (18) and (19) are logically equivalent. Moreover,
they respectively describe
20) [(Jones, t ) , constructs an equiangular triangle], and
21) [(Jones, t ) , constructs an equilateral triangle].
Since the constitutive properties of these events are distinct,
it follows according to Kim's theory, that the events are
distinct. We might wonder, of course, whether these ought to
be construed as distinct events, but that is another question.
Kim also objects to (C)
,
the principle which sanctions
substitution of co-extensive singular terms in event-describing
statements. Since, as we have already seen, Kim thinks that
Socrates' dying and Xantippe's husband's dying are the same
event, we should expect that the co-extensive term 'Xantippe's
husband' could be substituted for 'Socrates' in 'Socrates died'
without change of reference. However, the following kind of
case seems objectionable to Kim. Suppose that Wilbur is both
the best player on the team and the fastest player on the
team, then,
22) The best player on the team = the fastest player on
the team.
In virtue of (22)
,
(C) would have it that
23) Wilbur is the best player on the team, and
24) Wilbur is the fastest player on the team
12
describe the same event. Kim notes that there is an ex-
planatory asymmetry between (23) and (24). We might, for
example, explain the former by reference to the latter, but
we would probably not explain Wilbur's being the fastest
player on the team by pointing out that he is the best player.
Kim responds to this case by invoking a distinction of
Wiggins' between genuine identity statements and statements
of predication. According to Kim (23) and (24) are statements
of predication, and the singular terms in the respective
predicates do not make "genuine reference". Finally, Kim
says that co-extensive singular terms may be substituted in
an event-describing statement only if the terms make "genuine
reference" in the statement. Incidentally, since genuine
identity statements do not attribute an empirical property
to an object at a time, they are not event-describing state-
ments. This restriction serves to further block the above
trivialization argument, since (2) ana (3) cannot describe
the same event if they are not event-describing statements
in the first place.
Not all have agreed with Kim's rejection of (L) and (C) .
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F. Robert Bohl, Jr., for example, has argued that Kim's
counter-examples to (C) and (L) are implausible and that the
supposition that sentences refer commits one to those
principles. Although I have already argued that Kim has
failed to provide counter-examples to (L) restricted to
event-describing statements, I do not find Bohl's rejection
13
of Kim's examples especially convincing. He says, for example,
that the location at which an event occurs is often unclear.
With this I agree, but the fact that the location of an event
is sometimes unclear does not refute the claim that Socrates'
dying and Xantippe ' s becoming a widow are distinct. For it
is clear that the former occurred only in the prison and the
latter did not occur only in the prison. Bohl also thinks
that explanatory asymmetry cannot be used to individuate
events. His claim is that events are explained only "under
a description", and thus, what counts as an explanation of
an event depends in part on how the event is described. I
shall not attempt here to make sense of the notion of ex-
1
8
planation "under a description". Rather, I shall discuss
Bohl's claim that if sentences are taken as referring ex-
pressions, (L) and (C) ought to hold.
Bohl claims that if we take sentences to be referring
expressions, we should strive to avoid any disanalogy between
sentences and other referring expressions such as proper names
and definite descriptions. He says.
In order that we make the analogy between sentences
and other referring expressions as strong as possible,
we ought to have some way of saying that sentences
refer to the same entity without mentioning those
sentences. It is clear that material equivalence will
not do at all, for then any two true sentences will
refer to the same event. To accept logical equivalence
would be to accept [ (L) ]
.
Stronger, intensional con-
nectives will serve to break the analogy down, for we
do not need such a strong connective for definite
descriptions and names; such connectives would probably
serve only if we were willing to say two sentences refer
to the same event if and only if they mean the sam^g
thing, which would clearly be unacceptable to Kim.
14
The exact structure of Bohl's argument is not clear to me,
but, he elsewhere provides a hint as to what he means. "...
[W]e have a straightforward way of saying in our language
that two ordinary referring terms are co-referential, namely,
identity sentences. We do not have an analogous way of saying
that two sentences are co-referential, i.e., a way in which
we use rather than mention the sentences." 20 Perhaps Bohl
\
has something like the following in mind: "In the case of
names and descriptions, we can say things like
25) Cicero = Tully.
What (25) says is that two names are co-referential, and it
says this by using the names, not by mentioning them. If
sentences are to be referring expressions analogous to names
and descriptions, there must be a way of saying that two
sentences are co-referential without mentioning the sentences.
An obvious device for accomplishing this is to assert that
two sentences are logically equivalent."
But this seems to be mistaken. (25) does not assert
that two names are co-referential, that is, (25) does not
assert that
26) 'Cicero' and 'Tully' are co-referential.
To see this, it suffices to note that (26) , but not (25) en-
tails that the expressions 'Cicero' and 'Tully' exist. So
perhaps Bohl means that if two names are co-referential we
can form an assertion of identity which uses rather than
mentions the expressions. If sentences are to be analogous
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to names and descriptions, we ought to be able to do something
similar with them. The only natural option seems to be to
assert their logical equivalence.
First a minor quibble: ordinarily, when we assert that
two sentences are logically equivalent, we mention, rather
than use, the sentences, as when we say, falsely,
27) 1 Xantippe ' s husband died' is logically equivalent
to 'Xantippe became a widow'.
Thus, 'is logically equivalent to' cannot be the sentential
analogue of '='
.
We can, using a slightly more complicated
connective, avoid this criticism, as in
28) Necessarily, Xantippe ' s husband died if and only
if Xantippe became a widow.
We have already seen that Kim would regard (28) as an unac-
ceptable way of expressing event-identity, because it is too
broad, leading to an identification of distinct events. But
requiring logical equivalence for two statements to describe
21the same event Is also too stringent, for according to Kim,
'Socrates dies' and ' Xantippe 's husband died' refer to the
same event although they are not logically equivalent.
To return to Bohl's argument, why is 'Necessarily, if
and only if...' the only natural sentential analogue of '='?
If we reflect for a moment on the fact that (25) would
normally be expressed in English, not by using the identity
sign ' =
'
,
but as
29) Cicero is the same person as Tully
we might think of an alternative to 'Necessarily, if and
only if...'. In fact, I think a sentential connective which
16
satisfies Bohl's requirement that the connective operate on
sentences and not on names of sentences and which satisfies
Kim s intuitions as to which events are identical, is
' That
,
is the same event as that...'. If this connective
does the trick, then accepting that sentences refer and that
they bear a close analogy to names and descriptions need not
commit us to (L)
.
We might think that no instance of this schema will be
true, since the result of pre-fixing 'that' to a sentence
denotes a proposition, not an event. Thus, all instances
of this schema would say that some proposition is the same
event as some other proposition, and such a claim would, on
the face of it, seem to be false. Nevertheless, it is surely
open to Kim to deny that, for example, 'that Socrates died'
denotes a proposition and assert rather that it denotes an
event. This seems to fit in with his claim that the sentence
'Socrates died' refers to an event. Thus, I do not think that
he need be committed to (L)
.
Bohl also claims that considerations similar to those he
has already advanced should force us to accept (C)
,
if we
believe that sentences refer to events and if we believe that
sentences should bear a close analogy to other referring ex-
pressions. Kim denied that co-extensive singular terms can
be substituted in event-describing sentences without the
possibility of a shift in reference unless the singular terms
make genuine reference in the containing sentences. But
17
according to Bohl:
Again if we consider the analogy between sentences
and other referring expressions, e.g.
,
definite
descriptions, we find that in the case of definite
descriptions such as 'the present king of Greece' 22
we may substitute for terms which do not make genuine
reference, in this case 'Greece', and there is no
change of reference. If, then, sentences are to be
referring expressions, there would seem no reason to
restrict possible substitutions in the way Kim suggests.
Bohl goes on to claim that (C) is plausible because "there is
an analogy between it and principles which are appropriate to
our usual English referring expressions." Bohl's point, pre-
sumably, is that given the truth of
30) Greece = the country whose capital is Athens
we can replace 'Greece' by 'the country whose capital is Athens'
in 'the present king of Greece' to obtain an expression which
also denotes King Constantine, even though 'Greece' does not
make genuine reference in the first description. The most
that this shows, however, is that some substitutions of co-
extensive terms within definite descriptions, even where those
terms do not make genuine reference, preserves reference. But
Kim can consistently admit that, as well as admitting that
some substitutions of co-extensive singular terms in event-
describing statements preserves reference, even though the
terms fail to make genuine reference. For example, I believe
that Kim would hold that the following pair of statements
refer to the same event.
31) The present king of Greece lives in Italy.
32) The present king of the country whose capital is
Athens lives in Italy.
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We can admit that the inference that (31) and (32) describe
the same event given the truth of (30)
,
is a correct instance
of (C) without thereby being committed to the truth of (C)
.
And Kim has merely held that not all of the inferences
sanctioned by (C) are correct. Moreover, not all substitu-
tions of co-extensive singular terms within definite descrip-
tions preserve reference. There are exceptions when the
singular terms fail to make genuine reference or when they
fail to make any reference at all. Even given the truth of
33) The fastest player on the team = the best player
on the team.
'the property of being the best player on the team' and 'the
property of being the fastest player on the team' are not co-
extensive. Thus, given the failure of such substitutions in
the case of definite descriptions, Kim's rejection of (C)
seems to strengthen rather than weaken the analogy between
sentences and other referring expressions.
Note that (C) should not be confused with the more
plausible principle (C'):
C') If a statement S' is obtained from a statement S
by replacing any referring expression, <*
,
in S by
another referring expression, (3 , such that =* and £
are co-referential in S and S', respectively, then if
S is event-describing, S and S' describe the same
event.
Nor need Kim be construed as denying (C'). His claim may be
put as follows. If (23) is understood as a statement of
identity, that is, as
23') Wilbur = the best player on the team
19
then it is not event-describing. On the other hand, if (23)
is understood as a statement of predication, it amounts to
23'') Wilbur has the property of being the best player
on the team.
But 'the best player on the team' and 'the fastest player on
the team', though co-referential, are not co-referential in
the context 'the property that...'; and thus, substitution
of the one term for the other is not justified by ( c
' )
,
al-
though it is permitted by (C)
.
(C') is a close relative of
a familiar Fregean principle of substitution whereby substitu-
tion of singular terms in a given context is reference-
preserving not merely if the terms are co-extensive, but if
they are co-extensive in that context . It seems to be in
Kim's favor that he denies that unrestricted substitution of
co-extensive singular terms in an event-describing statement
preserves the identity of the event described. For the
analogue of (C) that co-extensive singular terms are every-
where substitutable without shift of reference, is false.
But it also seems to be in Kim's favor that what he says is
consistent with(C'), for given a Fregean semantics, the general
referential analogue of ( C
'
)
is indeed plausible.
In conclusion, then, Kim seems to me to be correct to
deny (L) and (C)
.
Finally, let me note that both of Bohl's
arguments require that there be a strong analogy between
sentences and other referring expressions if sentences are
to be referring expressions, but I know of no reason to think
20
that this is true, especially in the absence of an exact
specification of which characteristics are required to sustain
the analogy.
3. Criticism of Kim* s Theory . We have seen some of the
details of Kim's theory, and we have seen that it can plausibly
resist the challenge of a trivialization argument. Now let us
turn to a criticism of the theory. I think that the theory is
regretably vague in certain crucial respects. In this section
I shall try to indicate some of those respects.
Central to the Identity Condition IR is the generalized
notion of a converse of a relation, which Kim attempted to
formulate with the aid of permutations on sequences and rela
24 ,
tions associated with each permutation. Here again is how
Kim introduces k(R)
,
which is the converse of the relation R
generated by a permutation k on R. "If k is a permutation on
n-termed sequences and R is an n-adic relation, k(R) is to be
the n-adic relation such that, for every (xn )
,
(xn ) has k(R)
if and only if k
_1
(xn ) has R. It follows that,
for each k,
k (x ) has k ( R) if and only if (xR ) has R."
25 Let us, in a
— wn —
particular case, see how for a given relation we find its con-
verse. There is only one permutation--the identity
permutation
—on sequences of length 1. Thus, where n— 1, k ^2Sn^
So in the monadic case, the first of the two quoted
sentences
tells us that k(R) is the property (1-adic relation)
such
that, for every x, x has k(R) if and only if x
has R. But,
that for every property there is a uniqueis it the case
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property a thing has just in case it has the first property?
No, the familiar example that all and only creatures which
are members of a species whose well-formed members have a
heart are members of a species whose well-formed members
have a kidney provides a counter-instance. One property a
thing has if and only if it is a member of a species whose
well-formed members have a heart is the property being a
member of_ a species whose well-formed members have a heart.
But another property a thing has if and only if it has this
property is being a member of a species whose well-formed
members have a kidney . Thus, 'k(R)
'
is not well-defined.
In fairness to Kim, it should be noted that he admits that
he has not given a definition. He says, in a footnote, "This
is not intended as a definition, but only an informal ex-
position, of 'k(R) *
. As a definition it would likely be
construed as presupposing an extensional interpretation of
attributes (whether in the possible-world semantics or in
some other scheme)
,
whereas I prefer to be silent on this
2 6issue here." Let us take that parenthetical remark as a
hint as to how 'k(R)
'
should be defined. Instead of saying
that for all k and (x ) , k(R) is the relation (x ) has if
— Ayn — v»n
and only if k-^(x
n
) has R, we could require the stronger
condition that for all k and (x ) , k(R) is the relation such
—
~n —
that in all possible worlds (xR ) has k(R) if and only if
k“l(x
n )
has R. Let us see, again, how this revised definition
would work in a monadic case. As before, the inverse of any
22
permutation on 1 tuples is simply the identity permutation,
so the revision comes to:
34) (k) (x) (k(R) is the relation such that q (x has k(R)if and only if x has R) )
.
_ “
Does (34) succeed in defining 'k(R)' for monadic properties
R? I think that it does not; it is plausible only if properties
that are co-extensive in all possible worlds are identical.
But some properties co-extensive in all possible worlds are
not identical. Suppose that x is a triangle. Is there a
unique property which x has in all and only those worlds in
which x is an equiangular triangle? No, for one candidate is
the property being an equiangular triangle ; another is being
an equi lateral triangle Thus
,
this attempt to revise the
definition of 'k(R)
'
is unsuccessful. But then we do not
know exactly what is to count as the converse of a relation.
Another respect in which Kim's account of events is
vague, is that he places restrictions on which attribuces
are eligible to be constitutive attributes of events without
making clear exactly how these restrictions are to be under-
stood. An important feature of Kim's theory is that every
event has a unique constitutive property. These constitutive
27properties he calls "generic events". But exactly winch
properties count as "generic events"? Kim does say that
constitutive properties must be empirical or factual. He
suggests that this condition is intended to exclude tautological
or evaluative properties. But until we have a precise idea of
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what empirical, factual, and tautological properties are,
we cannot know exactly which properties can be constituents
of events.
Kim also says that no "concocted" properties can be
constituents, although except for suggesting that being
fifty mile east of a burning barn is concocted, he gives no
clue as to which properties he means to exclude.
Finally, as we have already noticed, Kim excludes
"mixed universals", requiring that constitutive properties
be "pure universals". According to Kim, x stabs Caesar is a
"mixed universal", while x stabs y is "pure". We might pro-
pose the following as an attempt to characterize this
distinction.
M) Pn is mixed if and only if (Ey) £ f°r anY sequence
(xi , . . . , Xjj
)
[Pn (x]_, . .
. ,5^) (EPn+1 ) (Pn+ f (xy, . . . ,Xn,y) ) ] }
P) Pn is pure Pn is not mixed.
(M) has the result, as it should, that x stabs Caesar i_s
mixed. There is some y_, namely, Caesar, such that if anyone
stabs Caesar, there is a relation, namely, x stabs y_, such
that (Caesar's stabber, Caesar) satisfies x stab s y. Note
that the arrow in (M) must stand for strict implication and
not material implication, for otherwise every property will
be mixed. To see this, pick some property P. If P is not
exemplified, (M) is true vacuously. If P is exemplified,
then there is something, say Socrates, such that the' c is a
property, namely, P and x is a^ man, such tnat (whatever
satisfies P, Socrates) satisfies this latter property.
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The following, however, seems to be a counter-example
to (M) . There is something, namely, the number nine, such
that if anything, z^, is a man, ( z
_
, 9) satisfies x is_ a man
£ ¥_ is. a. number . But this property seems intuitively (at
least insofar as this distinction is intuitive) to be pure.
We can avoid this objection by recasting (M) as
(M* ) pn p s miXed if and only if (Ey) [ y exists
contingently & for any sequence (x-[ , . . . ,xn )
[Pn(x lf . .
.
f xn ) (EPn+1) (pn+1 (xp
,
. .
.
,x^
,y ) ) ] \
(M' ) appears to have the consequence that x is_ greater than
seven is pure, since seven exists necessarily. This contrasts
with x is_ taller than Galbraith
,
which is mixed. I think that
this is harmless enough; it merely suggests that the distinc-
tion between mixed and pure universals is a metaphysical one
\
rather than a linguistic one. Both (M) and (M') seem to have
the further consequence that x rides Pegasus into battle is
pure, since Pegasus does not exist. One way to avoid this
would be to prefix the characterization of 'mixed' with 'Q '.
Another way would be to add the conjunct 'is exemplified' to
the definiens of (P)
.
On this alternative some properties
would be neither mixed nor pure. Perhaps neither step need
be taken, for, according to Kim, only exemplified pure
universals are constituents of events.
There is, however, a more serious objection to (M'):
it entails that every property is mixed. Kim wants x stabs
y to be pure. But there is some 2^, namely, the event of
there being some stabbing event or other (call this event
25
'e') such that whenever a pair (a,b,) satisfies x stabs y,
there is a relation x stabs y and z_ is the event of there
—
-
me grabbing event which (a,b,e) satisfies. Since e
exists contingently
— it exists only in those worlds in which
someone stabs someone—it follows according to (M 1 ) that x
29
-
tabs
I. 1S mixed. Moreover
,
this objection seems to be
generaliz able
. I think that these considerations indicate
how difficult it is to characterize mixed universals. But
unless we have some adequate characterization, we do not know
which properties can be constituents of events.
Although we do not have a characterization in hand, we
can, I think, proceed to distinguish some mixed and pure
universals. The property x stabs Caesar is mixed; so is x
stabs y with this knife . The property x stabs y is pure; so
is x stabs y with a knife ; so are x stabs y regretfully and x
stabs y intentionally . We can suppose all of these pure
universals to have been exemplified by (Brutus, Caesar). Thus,
by the existence condition, [(Brutus, Caesar, t ) , x stabs y] ,
[(Brutus, Caesar, t)
,
x stabs y with a knife] , [(Brutus,
Caesar, t)
,
x stabs y regretfully], and [(Brutus, Caesar, t)
,
x stabs y intentionally] all exist. We might be puzzled by
the multiplicity of events here. We might wonder, for
example, how they are all related. Some of them could have
occurred without others of them having occurred. And we
might wonder which of them is Brutus' killing of Caesar.
The answer to this last question is, presumably, none of
26
them; for stabbing is not the same as killing
. Moreover, no
one of the mentioned events need have occurred for Brutus
'
killing of Caesar to have occurred. Here is another dif-
ficulty. Suppose Jones has a pain in his right foot and he
has a pain in his left foot. Then the following events exist:
[(Jones, t) has a pain], [(Jones, t)
,
has a pain in his right
foot], and [(Jones, t) has a pain in his left foot ]. 30 How
are these events related? It is tempting to say that the
first is a generic event of which the latter two are
particular instances. But this suggestion is not open to
Kim. For him, generic events are properties--those properties
which are constituents of events. Moreover, according to Kim,
no event is an instance of more than one generic event. Thus,
the last-named event is an instance of the generic event
having a pain in one ' s left foot
,
and not, on Kim's view,
an instance of Jones' having a pain.
So far I have discussed restrictions on which properties
may be constituents of events. But Kim also restricts the
objects which may be constituents of events. Kim says at
one point that events are "realizations of properties at
particular space-time regions or by objects (if one accepts
31
some sort of substance ontology) .... Kim goes on to say
that he opts for objects rather than space-time regions. In
another place Kim says that "we may represent an event by the
32
notation ' [x, P, t ]
'
where x is an object ('Substance')...,"
and he goes on to add that where "P is a mental property, that
27
may place a certain constraint on the kind of substance x
is " Thus, I think it is clear that the constitutive
objects of events must be substances according to Kim,
although it is certainly left open as to what a substance
is and what sorts of substances there are. But this restric-
tion seems to lead to a difficulty. Consider the apparent
event-describing statement, 'Beethoven's Ninth Symphony was
performed in 1824*. The obvious way of translating this
statement into Kim's canonical notation is as ' [(Beethoven's
Ninth, 1824), was performed]'. But this will not do, for
Beethoven s Ninth is not a substance. But then how do we,
in canonical notation, refer to the event (let us suppose
that the first performance was the only performance that year)
which was the first performance of Beethoven's Ninth ? Perhaps
the event can be construed as the having of a very complicated
property (involving playing certain notes in a certain order,
making certain motions and gestures, listening, and more) by
a very large sequence of objects (including the members of
the orchestra and chorus, the conductor, and perhaps even the
members of the audience) . Or perhaps there is some object,
maybe the concert hall, which has the property of being such
3 3that Beethoven's Ninth was first performed in it. But
even if we could establish what sort of property and what
sort of sequence the having of the former by the latter is
the first performance of Beethoven's Ninth
,
exactly which
property and which sequence is involved? As in the earlier
28
case of Brutus' killing Caesar, there seems to be an endless
number of possibilities. And this, I think points up an
important limitation in Kim's theory: he has given us a
fairly precise method for translating event-describing
statements into his canonical notation, but he has given us
no information at all as to how to put into canonical form
an event description which is a definite description.
Finally
,
there seems to be a kind of essentialism in-
volved in Kim's theory which I find counter-intuitive. The
point to be made applies equally, I think, to constitutive
objects and constitutive properties, but I shall put it in
terms of constitutive times. Suppose we consider some event
such as Jones' speaking from 8:00 p.m. to 9:45 p.m. Suppose,
further, that we have established that this event is [(Jones,
8:00-8:45), speaking]. We might normally say things like,
had this event been a little shorter it would have been more
effective, or had it been a little shorter the audience
might not have begun walking out. That is, we might normally
say of this event, call it 'S', that it could have been dif-
ferent in certain respects, and in particular, we might say
that S could have been a little shorter. But Kim's theory
has it that had Jones stopped speaking at 8:35, S would not
have existed, not that it would have been shorter. Of course,
if Jones had stopped speaking at 8:35, there would have been
another event, call it * S *
'
,
that would have existed instead.
But S* is a different event. My complaint can be put as
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follows: Kim's theory is committed to saying, in cases like
this, that there would have been a different event, and not
that an event would have been different.
It might be objected that this criticism does not really
appiy to Kim's theory. Suppose, continues the objector, that
someone introduces the following canonical notation to refer
to persons. A person S is named by ' [a,b,t ] 1 just in case
'a' names S's father, 'b' names S's mother, and t is the
time at which S was born. ' This theory could adopt the
existence condition that [x,£,t] exists if and only if at t y
delivers a child fathered by x. And the following condition
of person-identity is forthcoming: [x,y ' t] = [w , z , t '
]
if and
only if x=w, y=£, and t=t'
.
But now it need not be a conse-
quence of this theory of naming persons that the time at
which a person is born is the only time at which that person
could have been born. The fact that the time at which a
person is born is mentioned in the canonical name of the
person is irrelevant to whether it is essential to a person
that he be born at the time at which he actually is born.
Similarly, the objector might conclude, the fact that the
time at which Jones' speaking occurred is mentioned in the
canonical name of that event is irrelevant to whether that
event could have occurred at a different time.
I think that we can see that this objection is mistaken.
Kim has not merely given us an ingenious device for naming
events analogous to the device just considered for naming
30
persons. Rather, Kim thinks that it is important that we
recognize that events are structured—that they reflect the
structure of the sentences by which we typically describe
them. Thus, Kim's canonical notation is designed, in part,
to make explicit this structure. There is no analogous
structural similarity between persons and the parent-time-
of-birth names of the objector. Furthermore, Kim says more
than that events are structurally similar to complexes con-
structed from names of objects, properties, and times. He
says that events are complexes, consisting in the having of
a property by an object at a time . 35 Thus, I think that the
criticism that Kim’s view has an implausible essentialist
consequence is not rebutted by this objection. It should be
noted that I have not derived this essentialist view from
anything Kim has said. Thus, I may be mistaken in attributing
it to his theory. It might be that Kim has not told us
enough about his theory to tell whether his events could have
occurred at times other than the times at which they do occur.
In conclusion, we can admit that some support might be
found for Kim's theory of events by considering its usefulness
in dealing with particular problems, for example, causation
O /T
or mind-brain identity; although to examine these questions
would be beyond the scope of this work. Nevertheless, from
what we have seen of the theory, I think that we can agree
that many problems need to be solved before Kim's theory
can be judged an adequate theory of events.
Notes to Chapter I
31
"On the Psycho-Physical Identity Theory" American
Philosophical Quarterly 3 (1966): 227-235; "Events and
Their Descriptions: Some Considerations" in N. Rescher,
ed.
, Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel (Dordrecht, 1969)
:
198-215; "Causes and Events; Mackie on Causation" Journal
of Philosophy 68 (1971): 426-441; "Causation, Nomic Sub-
sumption, and the Concept of Event" Journal of Philosophy
70 (1973) : 217-236. I shall refer to these articles as
PPI
,
E&D, C&E, and CCE
, respectively.
2E&D 204.
3
I shall follow Kim and label 'monadic events' those
whose constitutive property is monadic, 'dyadic events'
those whose constitutive property is dyadic, etc. Strictly,
monadic events have dyadic constituent properties, since the
time of an event occupies an argument place in its constitutive
property. I shall ignore this complication, as does Kim.
4
It might be possible, following Chisholm, to define a
narrow sense of 'event' which applies only to those events
(in the broad sense) which involve change. Cf. "Events and
Propositions" Nous 4 ( 19 70 ) : 15-24
,
esp. p. 20.
5CCE 222-236.
Although Kim does not explain these terms, he refers,
as a possible explanation to Arthur W. Burks, "Ontological
Categories and Language", Visva-Bharati Journal of Philosophy
3 (1967): 25-46, esp. pp. 28f. I attempt below, pp. 21-23,
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to characterize "mixed universal" in a way that accords with
the few comments Kim makes about the notion.
7 .Kim notes that the n! permutations on sequences of
length n form a group. Strictly, a group can be thought of
as a triple (E, °, 0) , where E is a non-empty set, ° a binary
relation, and o an element of E such that, where 'a', ' b
'
,
and 'c' range over elements of E
i) (a) (b) (c) ( (a° (b°c) )=( (a°b) °c)
)
ii) (a) (0°a=a)
iii) (a) (Ex) ( (a°x) =0)
Now, for each n, let E be the n! permutations on n-termed
sequences, let ° be the relation of composition of permutation
(ki°k 2 = k 2 (k_i (xR ) ) ) , and let 0 be the identity permutation.
For n ^ 3 , the group formed from permutations on n-termed
sequences is non—Abelian, that is, composition of permutation
is not in general commutative.
8CCE 225.
9 In CCE Kim says that sentences refer to events (e.g.
,
222)
,
while in E&D he says that statements refer to events
(e.g., 204). He says that statements contain referring
expressions (206) and that one statement in different circum-
stances can be used to make different assertions (213)
.
Since he thus speaks of statements as linguistic entities,
containing expressions, and being used to express different
things, I take it that by 'statement' Kim means sentence,
or
at least that he does not intend to mark any
distinction by
his use of the two terms.
33
10
E&D 205.
I take it that two statements are logically equivalent
just in case the biconditional formed from them is necessarily
true
.
12
_, .ihis statement of the argument follows very closely
Kim
' s
.
13
E&D 209.
14.See above p. 2; also below, pp. 21-23.
I think that Kim is mistaken in thinking that what ex-
plains (13) need not explain (14), although I shall not argue
the point here.
16„ ...David Wiggins, "Identity-Statements" in Analytical
Philosophy
,
ed. R. J. Butler, (Oxford, 1965)
,
Second Series,
esp. pp. 42-46.
17 ii
"On Sentences Referring", forthcoming in Logique et
Analyse
,
Sept., 1973.
18_For some attempts see Davidson, "Causal Relations",
Journal of Philosophy 64 (1967) : 691-703; "Eternal vs.
Ephemeral Events", Nous
, 5 (1971); 335-349, esp. pp. 340f
.
;
Bohl, "Events, Adverbs, and Prepositions", (forthcoming);
for a criticism of the notion cf. Chisholm, "States of Affairs
Again", Nous
,
5 (1971): 179-189, esp., pp. 187f.
19
"On Sentences Referring", (7). References to this
article in parentheses are to pages of the manuscript.
20 Ibid
. (5).
21E&D 21.
34
I assume that current political developments are
irrelevant to this example and that 'the present king of
Greece' denotes King Constantine.
23
0p. cit
. (9)
.
24See pp. 3f
. ,
above.
25
CCE 225.
26 tk .,Ibid
.
27
Ibid. 226.
28
Ibid. 231.
29
I am indebted to Fred Feldman for this example. It
might be thought that the event in question, that is, the
event, e, of there being some stabbing event or other is
(ie) (Ex) (Ey) (Et) ( [ (x,y , t) , stabs]=e) . But this formula
denotes a unique event just in case one individual stabs
one individual; and if, for example, the only stabbing in
some world is that of Caesar by Brutus, then in that world
the above formula picks out the event of Brutus stabbing
Caesar, and not the event of there being some stabbing event
or other. But why not let the event in question be ( •-} e)
(Ex) (Et) ( [ (x, t) , is such that there is some stabbing event
or other]=e)? In order for this event to be one which
exists in all and only those worlds in which someone stabs
someone, let x= the number nine.
30 ...
If one thinks that Jones could not have a pain m his
right foot without having the particular right foot that he
has, then having a pain in his right foot is mixed. The
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event should then be described as [(Jones, Jones' right foot,
t)
,
x has a pain in y ] . Similar remarks hold for Jones' left
foot. If Jones could have had a pain in his right foot while
possessing a different foot, what is the relation between the
event just mentioned and the monadic event mentioned in the
text? On Kim's view the relation is not identity.
31C&E 438.
32
"Phenomenal Properties, Psychophysical Laws, and the
Identity Theory", Monist 56 (1972): 177-192.
33 .Kim suggested this possibility in conversation. The
event in question could be represented as (qe) ((Ex) ( [ (x, 1824)
is such that Beethoven's Ninth is first performed in it]=e))'
Kim suggested the city in which the performance took place as
a value of x. I find the concert hall a more plausible choice
Given that there is more than one choice available, we might
wonder whether there is a unique event e. The point made in
the text remains: we are confronted with indefinitely many
candidates for the event which is the first performance of
Beethoven's Ninth.
34This example is due to Fred Feldman. We can assume, for
the sake of the discussion, that no two children of the same
parents are born simultaneously.
3 5CCE 222, 226; "Phenomenal Properties, Psychophysical
Laws, and the Identity Theory", 182-185; C&E 438f.
36 For the former see C&E and CCE; for the latter see PPI
and the paper mentioned in note 32.
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CHAPTER II
DAVIDSON'S ACCOUNT OF ACTION SENTENCES
In this chapter and the next I shall examine Donald
Davidson's treatment of the logical form of action sen-
tences. This chapter will be mainly expository; criticism
of Davidson's theory will come later. In the first section
I shall indicate the larger context against which Davidson's
treatment of action sentences may be seen as a working out
of details. That larger context is Davidson's program of
giving a theory of meaning for English by defining a
Tarski-type truth predicate. In the second section I shall
set out some of the details of Davidson's treatment of
action sentences. In the third section I shall note two
restrictions on the range of application of Davidson's
novel treatment of adverbial modification. Finally, I
shall consider an objection to Davidson's account posed
by J, A. Fodor. I shall argue that Davidson's theory
can cope with Fodor 's objection.
1. Davidson ' s Program . Davidson's attempt to give the
logical form of action sentences is part of a general prog-
ram of giving a theory of meaning for English. According
to Davidson, all that is required for a theory of meaning
for a language L is a theory which places enough restrict-
ions on a predicate 'is T' to entail all true sentences of
the form
(T) s is T if and only if p,
where
'
s
1
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is a structural description of a sentence of L
and 'p' is replaced by that sentence
.
1
in effect, all
Davidson requires of a theory of meaning is that it satisfy
Tarski's convention T for the adequacy of a formal seman-
tical definition of truth
.
2
As Davidson puts it, "the def-
inition works by giving necessary and sufficient conditions
for the truth of every sentence, and to give truth cond-
itions for the truth of every sentence, and to give truth
conditions is a way of giving the meaning of a sentence. 3 "
Furthermore, Davidson thinks that any successful definition
of 'is T* will automatically reveal the semantically sig-
nificant structure of the sentences of the language.
Davidson apparently thinks that the revelation of seman-
tically significant structure is automatic, because "the
theory must work by selecting a finite number of truth-
affecting constructions from which all sentences are com-
posed. The theory then gives outright the semantic pro-
perties of certain of the basic expressions
,
and tells how
the constructions affect the semantic properties of the
4expressions on which they operate.
"
A technique which Davidson employs in a first step
toward providing a truth definition for English is to trans-
late certain English sentences into a canonical, extu.sion-
al, first-order language. If a technique can be found for
translating parts of English into such a language, then the
truth-definition of the formal language can be extended to
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include those English sentences which can be shown (by the
translation technique, perhaps) to have the same truth con-
ditions as sentences of the formal language. 5 By trans-
lating fragments of English into a first-order language
Davidson hopes to bring those fragments within the scope of
a recursive definition of truth, and hence within the scope
of a theory of meaning. Davidson's account of the logical
form of action sentences, which consists in specifying a
canonical first-order language into which English action
sentences can be translated, can be seen as a first step
in a program of giving a theory of meaning for English.
Many questions might be raised at this point.
Is giving a Tarski-like truth-definition really all there
is to giving a theory of meaning? Does every successful
definition of the truth predicate automatically reveal sig-
nificant semantic structure? Can significant fragments of
English be mechanically translated into a first-order lan-
guage? I propose to ignore these questions, however, and
plunge ahead with an investigation of Davidson's account of
action sentences. My motivation for moving on is that even
if defining a truth predicate does not yield a theory of
meaning, translation of a troublesome fragment of English
into a canonical first-order language is interesting in
its own right, if only because the notion of logical con-
sequence for such a language is well understood.
2 . Davidson ' s Account of Action Sentences . Davidson
begins his analysis of action sentences with a problem which
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Kenny has called the problem of the "variable polyadicity
"
7of action verbs. A typical account of the logical form
of
(1) Jones buttered the toast in the bathroom with a
knife at midnight
would make 'buttered' a five-place predicate taking, in this
case, 'Jones', 'the toast', 'the bathroom', 'a knife', and
'midnight' as arguments. The same approach would construe
'buttered' in
(2) Jones buttered the toast in the bathroom with a
knife
as a four-place predicate. Similarly, in
(3) Jones buttered the toast
'buttered' would be taken as a two-place predicate. This
strategy has at least two drawbacks. In the first place,
it fails to account for the fact that (1) entails (2) and
(2) entails (3)
.
I shall call such inferences instances
of modifier elimination. Secondly, it ignores the fact
that 'buttered' is a common syntactic element of each of
(1) , (2) , and (3) .
The ploy of taking (3) as elliptical for
(3') Jones buttered the toast somewhere with something
at sometime
fares no better, for we seem to be able to add extra places
to the predicate at will. For example, we could add to (1)
'on January 20'. Thus we do not seem to be able to tell in
general how many places an action verb should be construed
as having to accommodate all possible constructions.
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Davidson's solution is to suggest that verbs of action
contain an implicit place for singular terms referring to,
or variables ranging over, events. Action sentences are
existential quantifications over events. Thus,
(4) Shem kicked Shaun
amounts, on Davidson's account, to
(5) (Ex) (Kicked (Shem, Shaun, x) ) .
which is read "There is an event x such that _x is a kicking
of Shaun by Shem. " In
(6) Shem kicked Shaun behind the garage
Davidson would regard 'behind the garage' not as introducing
an additional place into the three-place predicate 'kicked'
,
but rather as qualifying any event satisfying the implicit
existential quantification. Thus, (6) would be rendered as
(7) (Ex) (Kicked (Shem, Shaun, x) & Behind (the garage,
x) ) .
That is
,
"There is an event x such that x is a kicking of
Shaun by Shem and x occurred behind the garage."
In addition to showing that action verbs do not suffer
from "variable polyadicity " , Davidson's account has the
merit of showing that the inference of (4) from (6) is a
matter of logical form. Moreover, the Davidsonian para-
phrases are extensional . Given the truth of
(8) Shem = the meanest kid on the block
it follows from (5) that
(9) (Ex) (Kicked (the meanest kid on the block, Shaun,
x) ) .
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Davidson regards this as an advantage because extension-
ality allows the possibility of giving a recursive def-
inition of truth.
3. Not All Grammatical Modifiers Get the Treatment.
\
" ’
Davidson's paraphrase of (6) relies on taking the pre-
positional phrase in (6) as a predicate demanding its own
conjunct. For grammatical modifiers that can be so treated,
modifier elimination is clearly a matter of logical form.
Those modifiers which "introduce a new entity (a place, an
instrument, or time) " ought to be so treated, according to
Davidson. Examples include, in addition to 'behind the
garage', the prepositional phrases of (1): 'in the bathroom,
'with a knife', and 'at midnight'. Davidson explicitly
withholds his treatment from modifiers, such as 'slowly',
which might be called "adverbs of manner". Davidson
suggests that ’Susan crossed the Channel slowly' should not
be understood as 'There is an event of Susan's crossing the
Channel and it was slow'; for Susan's crossing might have
been a fast swimming. If Davidson's treatment of gram-
matical modifiers applied to 'slowly' and 'fast', he would
be committed to holding that Susan's crossing the Channel
(which in the case described Davidson identifies with
Susan's swimming the Channel) was both slow and fast. This
difficulty is similar to the one involved in giving the
logical role of 'small* in 'Bimbo is a small elephant',
given that Bimbo is not small for a mammal. We do not want
to treat 'small' as an independent predicate requiring its
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own clause, for then we could infer that Bimbo is an ele-
phant and he is small and he is a mammal and he is not
small. Since this problem is not unique to modifiers in
action sentences, Davidson thinks that he can ignore it.
Davidson also declines to treat such adverbs as 'del-
iberately' or 'intentionally' as predicates of events.
His reason here is that "intentional actions are not a class
8of actions
. To say that an action is intentional is
,
according to Davidson, "to describe the action in a way
that bears a special relation to the beliefs and attitudes
9of the agent." Davidson sometimes speaks of an action
being intentional "under a description", by which he ap-
parently means to express a relation between an agent, an
event, and a description. I shall postpone discussion of
this topic.
Exactly which adverbial modifiers are to be treated as
predicates? Are there modifiers in addition to adverbs of
manner and adverbs imputing intention to which Davidson's
treatment ought not be extended? I do not know the answer
to these questions. My intent in this section is merely to
call attention to these restrictions and to suggest that
they should be born in mind while assessing Davidson's
claims to have given a theory of adverbial modification."^
4. Sentential vs . Verbal Modifiers . Fodor claims
that some modifiers ought in some contexts be construed
as modifying an entire sentence and in other contexts be
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construed as modifying a verb phrase. "English acknowledges
least) two kinds of relations between an adverbial
phrase and the other structures in a sentence which con-
tains it. The adverbial phrase may modify the entire sen-
tence, or it may modify (just) the verb phrase of the sen-
tence." 11 Fodor further claims that Davidson's notation is
only able to capture at most one of these two kinds of con-
structions. He suggests that this is a serious difficulty
for Davidson, "that Davidson's theory is at best insuf-
ficiently rich to account for the full range of types of
relations that English allows between events [sic] and
12their modifiers."
I shall consider two of the examples with which Fodor
attempts to support his claims. I shall suggest with res-
pect to each of them that they can be handled within
Davidson's notation, and thus, I shall conclude that Fodor
has not found a serious difficulty with Davidson's analysis.
Fodor first considers the following sentences.
(10) John spoke clearly,
(11) John spoke, clearly,
(12) Clearly, John spoke.
Fodor notes that 'clearly' in (10) modifies the verb 'spoke',
while in (11) and (12) 'clearly' modifies the sentence
'John spoke'. Thus, the logical form of (10) ought to
differ from the logical form of (11) and (12) . Fodor then
claims that the only relevant translation available to
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Davidson is(13)
(Ex) (Spoke (John, x) & Clearly (x)).
Fodor concludes that (13) might be an analysis of (11) and
(12)
,
but as an analysis of (10)
,
"it would appear to be a
\
non-starter.
"
Fodor does seem to be correct in claiming that
' clearly * can modify either a verb phrase or a sentence.
We might take note of some differences in the two con-
structions. As a verbal modifier, 'clearly' is a com-
parative, and suffers from a difficulty noted above 13 in
connection with the adverb 'slowly'
. As Fodor is aware,
John might speak clearly for someone with his mouth full of
marbles
,
but unclearly for someone who has taken five years
of elocution lessons. As a sentential modifier, 'clearly'
also functions as a comparative. One sentence might be
more clear than another. But the sentential modifier
'clearly* is also incomplete in a certain respect. Sen-
tences are often clear to someone. Thus, a sentence might
be clear to Saul Kripke
,
but unclear to the rest of us.
Finally, as a sentential modifier, 'clearly' is opacity-
inducing. Given appropriate assumptions,
(14) Clearly, Cicero wrote Cicero's Orations
,
and
(15) Cicero = Marcus Tullius
are true
,
although
(16) Clearly, Marcus Tullius wrote Cicero's Orations
is false.
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One reply which Davidson might make to Fodor's object-
ion is that comparatives, like 'clearly' in both of its
constructions, 'slowly' and 'small', among others, were ex-
plicitly excluded from his account of action sentences, on
the ground that the problems such words raise are not
unique to their occurrences in action sentences. Fodor
claims, however, that his objection does not depend on the
comparative feature of the adverb 'clearly', and if there
are adverbial phrases not excluded by Davidson which do
function as both verbal and sentential modifiers
,
the
problem will have to be faced at some point. So let us
see whether Davidson has a more satisfying reply.
Fodor claimed that
(13) (Ex) (Spoke (John, x) & Clearly (x))
analyzes
(12) Clearly, John spoke
(or (11)), and that
(10) John spoke clearly
is left unanalyzed by Davidson's theory. Why take (13) as
the translation of (12) rather than (10)? Fodor is ap-
parently led to do so by noting that the variable 'x' in
(13) is naturally replaced by a nominalized sentence, for
14
example, 'John's speaking'. Thus, Fodor thinks 'clearly'
in (13) is a modifier of a sentence (albeit a nominalized
one), and so (13) translates (12) in which 'clearly'
functions as a sentential modifier. I think that this line
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of reasoning is misleading. in the first place, nominal-
ized sentences are not the only natural replacements for
event variables. Other candidates include singular terms
and definite descriptions, for example, 'Super Bowl VII'
and the first speech John made' . But more importantly,
Fodor seems to have confused the metalinguistic predicate
'Clearly' of (13) with the object language adverb
clearly
' . That the former can take as argument a nom-
inalized sentence is not by itself grounds for thinking
that it translates the sentence-modifying use of the
latter. In fact, it is up to Davidson to tell us what the
metalinguistic predicate 'Clearly' translates, since it is
not, after all, English. To see that the distinction is
important, consider Davidson's paraphrase of
(17) I flew my spaceship to the Morning Star,
which is
(17a) (Ex) (Flew (I, my spaceship, x) & To(the Morning
Star, x) )
.
Now entails
(18) (Ex) (To (the Morning Star, x )
)
If (18) is read as 'There is something to the Morning Star',
it is patently nonsense. The temptation to so read (18) is
lessened if it is realized that the metalinguistic predi-
cate 'To' occurring in (18) is something other than the
object language preposition 'to' occurring in (17). Of
course, (17a) does not make sense until it is given sense,
and part of what is involved in doing that is defining the
47
metalinguistic predicate 'To'. We may suppose Davidson to
have done this by saying that 'To(x,£)' is satisfied by
a pair <a,b> just in case b is an event involving motion
toward and terminating at a. 16 it would be inappropriate,
however, to render
(19) Privatus dedicated his poem to the Morning Star"^
as
(19a) (Ex) (Dedicated (Privatus
,
his poem, x) & To (the
Morning Star, x) ) ,
~
since Privatus
' dedicating presumably did not involve
motion toward and terminating at the Morning Star. To
account for (19) Davidson will have to introduce a new
binary metalinguistic predicate, perhaps 'To^'
,
correspond-
ing to the object language preposition 'to' of (30). Then
if b is an event involving dedicating to a, ' Tod
' will
hold of the pair <a,b>. Davidson's task is enormously more
complicated than it might initially have seemed. For cor-
responding to the preposition 'to' he will have to have
several, perhaps many, metalinguistic predicates, one for
each of the many distinct uses of the preposition. A sim-
ilar point holds, generally, for every English word that
admits of a variety of uses
. But then it seems unlikely
that English could ever be mechanically translated into
Davidson's canonical notation. Worse, it seems unlikely
that we could non-trivially give a semantics for English
by first translating it into a canonical notation like
Davidson’s and then giving a semantics for the canonical
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notation. For, in order to decide, for example, whether
an English sentence including the preposition 'to' should
go over into a canonical sentence including the predicate
'To', 'Tod ', or some other predicate, we must already know
*
what the English sentence means. If all occurrences of
the preposition 'to 1 were translated by one metalinguistic
predicate
f
we might hope that the translation procedure
could be purely syntactic. But since, as we have seen,
several metalinguistic predicates are needed to handle the
various uses of the English preposition, it seems likely
that a purely syntactic translation procedure would be un-
workable
.
To return to the question of whether (13) translates
(12)
r
I have suggested that the fact that the variable in
(13) is replaceable by a nominalized sentence is no ground
for thinking that (13) captures the sentential modifier
use of 'clearly'. I have also suggested that it is up to
Davidson to define the metalinguistic predicate 'Clearly'.
If both of these claims are correct, we can go on to imag-
ine that Davidson has told us that the metalinguistic
open sentence ' Clearly (x) ' is satisfied by a unary sequence
<a> just in case a is an event involving sound or speech
that is distinctly perceptible. Then,
(13) (Ex) (Spoke (John
,
x) & Clearly (x)
)
is most naturally construed as translating
(10) John spoke clearly,
49
where 'clearly' is a verbal modifier.
How then could Davidson translate (11) and
(12) Clearly, John spoke,
where 'clearly' is a sentential modifier? I suggest that
a plausible treatment would be
(20) Clearly ( (Ex) (Spoke (John
,
x) ) ) .
It might be objected that, as noted above, 'clearly' as
a sentential modifier is opacity-inducing. If it is, the
context created by 'Clearly' in (20) is non-extensional
,
and thus (20) is not available to Davidson, who requires
that action sentences be translated into an extensional
first-order language.
This objection is not serious, however. For (20) is
surely synonomous with
(21) It is clear that ((Ex) (Spoke (John, x) )
)
.
If we make the further assumption that (20) and (21) have
the same logical form, we are near a solution. Davidson
19has given an account of indirect discourse according to
which a sentence such as 'Galileo said that the earth
moves ' is represented as split into two semantic parts
:
Galileo said that.
The earth moves
.
The first sentence consists of the name of a subject, a
two-place predicate, and a demonstrative which refers to
the second sentence. The second sentence gives the content
of what Galileo said. In a similar way, Davidson could
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regard (21) as composed of the following two parts:
That is clear. (or, It is clear that.)
(Ex) (Spoke (John, x) )
.
The first sentence consists of a one-place predicate and
a demonstrative referring to the second sentence, which is
20
what is said to be clear.
I am not claiming either that Davidson's account of
indirect discourse is in fact ultimately successful or
that his account of indirect discourse can be applied
successfully to other constructions, such as 'It is clear
that,
.
,
' .
All I wish to claim is that this maneuver is
open to Davidson and that it is not, on the face of it,
unreasonable. But if this is correct, then Fodor is
mistaken in claiming that Davidson's notation cannot
formulate both (10) and (12)
.
Fodor gives another example which he claims poses a
problem for Davidson, Since this example is different in
certain respects from the previous case, it is worth ex-
amining separately. Fodor suggests that
(22) John aimed his gun at the target
is ambiguous. Fodor claims that (22) can answer the
question 'What did John aim his gun at?', in which case
he represents its structure as
(23) John ((aimed) at the target) his gun.
Fodor says that (22) can also answer the question 'Where
did John do his gun aiming?
' ,
in which case he represents
its structure as
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(24) At the target (John aimed his gun)
.
Fodor thinks that the adverbial phrase 'at the target' can
modify a verb, as it does according to the structural
analysis (23), or it can modify a sentence, as it does
according to (24)
,
Fodor suggests that the only para-
phrase available to Davidson's theory is
(25) (Ex) (Aimed (John, his gun, x) & At (the target,
x) T,
Finally, Fodor claims that (25) is a paraphrase of at
most one of the two readings of (22)
,
and thus there are
some action sentences which Davidson's theory cannot
express
.
A reply which Davidson would be unwilling to make
would be to claim that (22) under interpretation (23)
^
is best translated by the primitive predicate 'Aimed-at'.
Thus
,
(26) (Ex) (Aimed-at (John
,
his gun, the target, x) ) .
This reply could then accept (25) as the translation of
(22) under interpretation (24). But, taking 'Aimed-at'
as an unstructured predicate would obscure the fact that
'aimed' is a common syntactic element of both variants
of (22) and that 'at' is a common syntactic element of
'aim at', 'look at', 'point at', 'shoot at', and 'shout
22
at' .
A reply which Davidson might make is the following.
He could admit that (22) is ambiguous and that (25) is
the only translation of (22) in his notation, while
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maintaining that (25) is itself ambiguous, but harmlessly
so. There is some textual evidence for attributing such
a move to Davidson. "As long as ambiguity does not affect
grammatical form, and can be translated, ambiguity for
ambiguity, into the metalanguage, a truth definition will
not tell any lies. 23 However, it is Fodor ' s claim that
the ambiguity of (22) does affect its grammatical form.
So unless it can be shown that the ambiguity of (22) does
not affect its grammatical form, this reply does not seem
to be available to Davidson. Moreover,
(27) At the target, John aimed his gun
is unambiguous and seems to be translated by (25). If (25)
were ambiguous, Davidson's theory would translate an un-
ambiguous sentence, (27), by an ambiguous one, (25), and
there seems to be something wrong with that. So I suggest
that we look for another way out of Fodor ' s objection.
I do not think that we need to look very far. All
we need to do is notice that under interpretation (23)
'at' has the sense of 'in the direction of', while under
interpretation (24) 'at' has the sense of 'occurring near
or by'. Davidson can simply introduce into the meta-
language two predicates, perhaps 'At ' and 'At 9 ', with1 Z
' At ^
'
translating the former sense of 'at' and 'At
2
' t.rans-
24lating the latter. 'At^' would serve other purposes, as
well: it would figure in translations of such phrases as
'point at', 'look at'# and 'shoot at'.
Finally, this way of avoiding Fodor 's objection seems
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to deny the claim that 'at the target' functions in (22)
under interpretation (24) as a sentential modifier. But
that seems to be all right. I feel little inclination to
regard at the hop 1 as a sentential modifier in
(28) Danny lost his date at the hop,
yet the constructions are parallel. So I conclude that
Fodor has not uncovered any serious expressive inadequacy
in Davidson's theory.
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uses of the preposition 'to' see his "Comments on D.
Davidson's 'The Logical form of Action sentences'" in
The Logic of Decision and Action
,
104-112, esp. 108.
1
8
"The ideal implicit in this paper is a theory that
spells out every element of logical form in every English
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sentence about actions. I dream of a theory that makes
the transition from the ordinary idiom to the canonical
notation purely mechanical, and a canonical notation
rich enough to capture, in its dull and explicit way, every
difference and connection legitimately considered to be the
business of a theory of meaning." LFAS (reply) 115.
19 Davidson, "On Saying That" in Words and Objections
,
ed. Davidson and Hintikka (Dordrecht, 1969) :158-174
.
20 James McCawley also rejects attributing to Davidson
the thesis that 'clearly' in (27) is a predicate of an
event. Cf. "Fodor on Where the Action Is" Monist 57 (1973)
396-407. But McCawley suggests regarding 'clearly' in
sentences like (27) as a predicate of propositions .
Whatever merit this suggestion might have, it is not one
that would be agreeable to Davidson, since he shuns pro-
positions .
21
I use the expression ' (22) under interpretation (23) '
as elliptical for ' (22) understood in the sense in which it
is an answer to 'What did Jones aim his gun at?' and in
which sense (22) is said by Fodor to have the structure
shown in (23) '
.
An analogous remark holds for my use of
'(22) under interpretation (24)'. I do not want to be
committed to holding that (23) and (24) are meaningful or
that the two versions of (22) actually have whatever
structure (23) and (24) are supposed to reveal.
22
Cf. LFAS (reply) 118.
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23T&M 316.
24
Davidson will need additional 'At '
-predicates to
translate other uses of the preposition 'at', for example,
one for 'at' in 'at midnight'.
CHAPTER III
MORE ABOUT ACTION SENTENCES
58
In this chapter I shall offer some criticisms of
Davidson's account of action sentences. I shall first note
that there are some inferences not accounted for by
Davidson's theory. While this need not be taken as a
criticism of Davidson's claims about the logical form of
action sentences, it should raise some questions concerning
the relation between an account of logical form and a
theory of meaning. Next, I shall consider an objection to
i_he effect tha^ Davidson's theory is inadequate for giving
the logical form of certain sentences which describe an
agent doing two things at once. I shall consider an
attempted solution to this objection. Discussion of the
attempted solution will yield, in the third section of
this chapter, the discovery of a problem of variable poly-
adicity for prepositions. This in turn might raise some
doubts about Davidson's treatment of prepositional phrases.
Finally, I shall suggest that the attempted solution is
inadequate. I shall thus conclude that Davidson's account
of the logical form of action sentences is inadequate.
1 . Some Inferences
. There are some inferences which
are unaccounted for by Davidson's theory. For example,
although
(1) I sang the National Anthem
entails
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(2) I sang,
\
Davidson's formulation of these as
(la) (Ex) (Sang (I, the National Anthem, x) )
and
(2a) (Ex) (Sang (I
,
x)
)
is of no help in explaining the inference. The difficulty
is that Davidson takes transitive verbs to express three-
place predicates and intransitive verbs to express two-
place predicates. Given this, it is difficult to see how
a sentence like (1), containing a transitive verb, could,
as a matter of logical form, entail a corresponding sen-
tence like (2), which contains an intransitive verb.
Castaneda's solution’'" is to split transitive verbs
into a conjunction of binary predicates, each of which
expresses the same relation. This relation holds both
between the agent and an event and between the patient or
object and event. Thus, to use Castaneda's example,
(3) I flew my spaceship
becomes
(3a) (Ex)(Flew(I, x) & Flew(my spaceship, x ) )
.
Given that
(4) I flew
is represented as
(4a) (Ex) (Flew (I
,
x) )
,
Castaneda regards taking (3) as (3a) as advantageous since
it makes the entailment of (4) by (3) a matter of form.
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However, not all transitive verbs are such that sentences
containing them entail a corresponding sentence containing
a corresponding intransitive verb. As Davidson notes,
(5) I sank the Bismarck
and
(6) I sank
are of the same logical form as (3) and (4), but (5) does
not entail (6)
.
In fact, it is doubtful that (3) entails
(4)
,
since
(7) I flew my model airplane
clearly does not. Thus, while adopting Castaneda's revision
allows us to account for the inference of (2) from (1) , it
also justifies many fallacious inferences.
Another inference which Davidson's theory misses is
the inference from (5) to
(8) The Bismarck sank.
Again, we might not want to attribute this inference to
logical form, since
(9) The Queen dissolved the Parliament
and
(10) The Parliament dissolved
are of the same logical form as (5) and (8)
,
yet (9) does
not entail (10) . Nevertheless, the inference of (8) from
(5)
,
as well as the inference of (2) from (1) , depends,
at least in part, upon the meanings of the verbs involved.
But Davidson's projected theory of meaning will igno: o this
aspect of the meaning of these sentences. Davidson's
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theory of meaning would tell us how to find the truth
values of these sentences given assignments to their
component parts; it would not tell us that for each pair
these truth values are connected.
2. Doing Two Things at Once
. A more serious difficulty
for Davidson's theory involves cases in which an agent does
two things at once. One such problem is attributed to
John Wallace. Suppose that while playing pool, John,
with one stroke of the cue, sends the cue ball into the
three and five balls. The three ball then hits the eight
ball into the side pocket, and the five ball sends the nine
ball into the corner pocket. Then,
(11) John hit the eight ball into the corner pocket
with the three ball and the nine ball into the
side pocket with the five ball.
The natural way to translate (11) into Davidson's notation
is as
(11a) (Ex) (Hit (John, the eight ball, x) & Into (the
corner pocket, x) & With (the three ball, x)
& Hit (John, the nine ball, x) & Into (the
side pocket, x) & With (the five ball, x) )
.
But (11a) entails not only that John hit the eight ball
into the corner pocket, as it should, but also that he did
it with the three ball, and that he did it with the nine
ball, and that he did it into the side pocket. Thus, (11a)
is inadequate as a translation of (11)
.
A revision of Davidson's account which is designed to
keep track of what is done to whom with what is to introduce
a place in the predicate translating a preposition for the
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oiroct °t>ject of the verb. Accordingly, we could translate
(11)
as
(lib) (Ex) (Hit (John, the eight ball, x) & Into (the
corner pocket, the eight ball, x) & With (the
three ball, the eight ball, x) & Hit (John,
the nine ball, x) & Into (the side pocket,
the nine ball, x) & With (the five ball, the
nine ball
,
x) ) .
Now (lib) does not entail that John hit the eight ball into
both the corner and side pockets. Nor does (lib) entail
that John hit the eight ball with both the three and the
five balls. And so sentences like (11) need not be
re<?<^ded ss a serious threat to Davidson's theory, if we
^^vise Davidson's theory along the lines suggested.
3. Variable Polyadicity and Prepositional Predicate s .
There is a minor difficulty with the method of introducing
a place in the predicates expressed by prepositions to be
filled with the direct object of the verb, and that is
that prepositions now suffer from variable polyadicity.
For the same preposition can occur in sentences with in-
transitive verbs as well as in sentences with transitive
verbs
. Thus
,
consider
(12) Brutus stabbed Caesar with a knife, and
(13) Brutus stabbed with a knife.
The first of these sentences would be formulated according
to the revised theory we are now considering as
(12a) (Ex) (Stabbed (Brutus
,
Caesar, x) & With (a knife,
Caesar, x) )
.
The revised theory does not say what to do with (13) . The
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natural paraphrase is
(13a) (Ex) (Stabbed (Brutus, x) & With (a knife, x) )
.
But now 'With' is a three-place predicate in (12a) and a
two-place predicate in (13a). Davidson's theory was motiv-
ated by a desire to escape the problem of variable poly-
adacity for verbs; it would not be much of a gain to escape
that problem at the expense of accepting a theory that was
committed to the variable polyadicity of prepositions.
It might be replied that Davidson has not entirely
avoided construing verbs as having variable polyadicity.
After all, verbs taking a direct object express a three-
place predicate
,
while verbs without a direct object
express a two-place predicate. It would only be fitting,
this reply would continue, to take prepositions in sen-
tences with a direct object as expressing a predicate of
one more place than they would express in sentences without
a direct object.
But even if we agree with Davidson that prepositions
are best treated as predicates, there is no intuitive
motivation for thinking that our ordinary prepositions
vary in any way corresponding to the variance in number of
places just described. Furthermore, the analogy between
the limited variable polyadicity of verbs and the limited
variable polyadicity of prepositions under consideration
breaks down when it is realized that the number of places
in a predicate expressed by a preposition can be increased
indefinitely. Consider,
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(14) I sailed with Alice and Betsy and Carol and Donna
Given that (14) and its obvious extensions are intended to
express a single sailing, their translations must look
something like
^ 14a
^ Do
~ ^ '—) & With (Alice
,
Betsy, Carol,
The predicate ‘With' now looks to be fully variably poly-
adic.
The problem of increasing places in prepositional
predicates can be resolved by simply taking one place to
be filled by a set which can be of any cardinality. 4 Thus,
(14) would become
(14b) (Ex) (Sailed(I,x) & With(}Alice, Betsy, Carol
Donna?, x) )
.
~
This maneuver suggests a similar device for handling
the variable polyadicity of prepositional predicates re-
sulting from the presence or absence of a direct object.
We simply stipulate that each predicate expressed by a
preposition have a place filled by an expression designating
the set containing the direct object, if there is one. 5
If there is no direct object, the place which in other
contexts might be filled by a set containing a direct
object is occupied by a symbol designating the null set.
Thus, (12) and (13) become
(13b) (Ex) (Stabbed (Brutus
,
Caesar, x) & With (£a
knFfe], £Caesarf, x) )
.
and
(14b) (Ex) (Stabbed (Brutus
,
x) & With([a knife}, A, x) )
.
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Prepositional predicates can now each be regarded as having
a fixed number of places. Of course, the devices just con-
sidered are entirely ad hoc.
However, not only are these devices ad hoc: they are
not entirely satisfactory. For
(14) I sailed with Alice and Betsy and Carol and Donna
entails
(15) I sailed with Alice.
Treating (14) as
(14b) (Ex) (Sailed (I, x) & With(fAlice, Betsy, Carol,
Donna }, A, x)
)
and (15) as
(15b) (Ex) (Sailed (I, x) & With ([ Alice], A
,
x ) )
obscures this inference. We could adopt a special rule
written schematically as follows
(PS) Where 'Prep' is any prepositional predicate and
A and B are sets such that B^A, from r(Ex)
(Prep (A
,
x) )~* infer r (Ex) (Prep (B
, x) P .
This rule would account for the inference of (15) from (14)
,
but it would sanction illicit inferences, as well. For
example
,
(16) I chose among Alice, Betsy, etc.
does not entail
(17) I chose among Alice,
but (PS) would justify such an inference.
A natural step to take at this point would be to
treat (14) as elliptical for
(14') I sailed with Alice and with Betsy and with Carol
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and with Donna.
Then (14) could be represented in Davidson's notation as
(14c) (Ex) (Sailed (I
,
x) & With QAliceJ, x) & With
(t Betsy } , x) & with (£Carol}
,
x) & With (£ Donna}
,
x) ) .«
If we accept this formulation, the appropriate entailments
will hold. This treatment could not, of course, be ex-
tended to (16) , But then is there a uniform treatment of
prepositions available to Davidson?
Suppose that prepositions divide neatly into those for
which inferences like the one from (14) to (15) hold and
those for which such inferences fail. For example, 'with'
and 'by' might be in the former class, 'among' and 'between'
in the latter. Then Davidson could require that all pre-
positional predicates take a set-expression in their first
argument-place, and he could adopt a version of (PS) re-
stricted to just those prepositions for which the relevant
inference holds . Or he could require that only those
prepositions in the second class always take a set-expres-
sion in their first argument-place, but that prepositions
in the first class yield to conjunctions, in the manner of
(14c)
,
when they appear to take a plurality of objects.
But it is not clear that prepositions can be so neatly
divided. For example, it seems to me that
(18) John was poisoned with arsenic and milk
does not entail
(19) John was poisoned with milk.
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But then with is in both classes of prepositions, since
the inference of (15) from (14) does hold. But, finally,
if prepositions cannot be divided exclusively into those
for which (PS) holds and those for which it does not, I
can think of no way in which Davidson’s treatment of
prepositions can both be applied in cases in which a
preposition appears to take more than one object and also
yield an account of the correct instances of (PS)
.
4. Conclus ion , In section 2 we considered revising
Davidson's theory to accommodate cases in which two things
are done at once. That revision consisted in introducing
into prepositional predicates a place for an expression
designating the set of the direct object (s) of a sentence.
Unfortunately, this revision is inadequate to handle all
Wallace-type objections. For how can the following
sentence be adequately translated?
(20) Brutus stabbed Caesar in the back with a knife
and in the chest with an ice pick.
If we assume that (20) is intended to report a single
action, it is not equivalent to the conjunction
(21) Brutus stabbed Caesar in the back with a knife
and Brutus stabbed Caesar in the chest with an
ice pick,
which could be true if Brutus did his back-stabbing on a
different occassion than his chest-stabbing. So the only
9
available way of translating (20) seems to be as
(20a) (Ex) (Stabbed (Brutus
,
Caesar, x) & In ( ithe back?,
£Caesar?, x & With(£a knife?, £ Caesar! , x) &
In ( [the chest!, [Caesar?, x) & With(£an ice pick!,
[Caesar?
,
x) )
.
68
But now (20a)
,
unlike (20)
,
entails that Brutus stabbed
Caesar in the back with an ice pick and that Brutus stabbed
Caesar in the chest with a knife. So (20a) is not an
adequate paraphrase of (20). Thus, apart from the dif-
ficulties involving prepositions considered in section 3,
I conclude that Davidson's theory, even as revised, is
inadequate to give the logical form of all action
sentences
,
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Notes to Chapter III
1
"Comments on D. Davidson's 'The Logical Form of
Action Sentences'" in N. Rescher, ed.
,
The Logic of
Decision and Action (Pittsburgh, 1966) :104-112.
2
Cf. Ch . II, Sec. 1, above.
3
I do not know if this objection has been published.
I am indebted to Greg Fitch for bringing this problem to
my attention and for suggesting the attempted solution (lib)
4
This strategy is inspired by a similar device adopted
by Castaneda, p. 107. \
^Castaneda has suggested that the place for the direct
object in the predicate expressed by a transitive verb be
filled by an expression designating the set containing the
direct object. This will accommodate sentences which have
more than one direct object - they can all be put into a
set. I do not discuss such cases, but the suggestion in
the text is clearly amenable to Castaneda's treatment.
^ I am indebted to Gareth B. Matthews for pointing
this out.
7Note that there is an analogous complication for verbs
gThe brackets surrounding each name are optional. For
simplicity, I have omitted the place for the null set in
each prepositional predicate.
9
I give the only available way of translating (20)
according to the revised version of Davidson's theory. I
assume that the problem raised in trying to translate (11)
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is sufficient to refute the unmodified theory. Incidental-
ly. (20) raises difficulties for the unmodified theory.
as well.
CHAPTER IV
DAVIDSON'S THEORY OF EVENTS
71
Davidson accepts a coarse-grained
Where others see several or many events
theory of events
.
/ Davidson sees only
one. Thus, m "Actions, Reasons and Causes" he says
th^rncl^ tUrn °n thS light ' and illuminatee room. Unbeknownst to me I also alert a prowlerf
K
C
^
th
?
fc 1 am home * Here 1 do not do four
been
9
given?l°
n Y °n® f ° f Which f°Ur descriptions have
It seems clearly to be Davidson's view that in the case
described, not merely is there only one thing which I do.
but there is only one event
. My flipping the switch is the
same event as my turning on the light, which is the same
event as my illuminating the room, which is the same event
as my alerting the prowler. Elsewhere Davidson writes
That the bullet pierced the victim was a consequence
of my pointing the gun and pulling the trigger. Itis clear that these are two different events, since
one began slightly after the other. But what is the
relation between my pointing the gun and pulling the
trigger, and my shooting the victim? The natural and,
I think, correct answer is that the relation is that
of identity
.
2
While Kim would hold that there are at least two events here,
my having the property of pointing the gun and pulling the
trigger at a particular time, and my having the property of
shooting the victim at a particular time, Davidson thinks
that there is just one. My pointing the gun and pulling the
just i^ my shooting the victim.
In this chapter I shall present some considerations which
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Davidson produces in support of his view, and I shall consider
\
Davidson's condition of event-identity. I shall claim that
neither his positive support nor his identity condition re-
quires that events be coarse-grained. Next I shall state
three objections to Davidson's theory, two of which I find
convincing. In an appendix I shall return to the topic,
postponed in earlier chapters, of action "under a description".
1 . Support for the Theory
. in "The Individuation of
3Events Davidson offers six considerations which he says are
'good reasons for taking events seriously as entities".
Since Davidson is concerned in that article to defend a
principle of event individuation which he thinks individuates
events coarsely, it is tempting to believe that Davidson re-
gards these six considerations not merely as "reasons ... for
accepting an explicit ontology of events" but as providing
support for individuating events coarsely. That temptation
is enhanced by the fact that Davidson seems to have given
no other reasons for preferring a coarse-grained individuation
of events. In this section I shall briefly list these con-
siderations. In the next section I shall try to indicate
how they might be supposed to support a coarse-grained ap-
proach to event individuation, and I shall claim that they
do not in fact support such an approach.
Davidson says first that events are needed for a theory
of action. "It is hard to imagine a satisfactory theory of
action if we cannot talk literally of the same action under
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different descriptions." He goes on to give an example of
what he thinks is one action under two descriptions. "Jones
managed to apologize by saying, 'x apologize'; but only be-
cause under the circumstances, saying 'I apologize' was
apologizing.
"
Davidson also suggests that we need events to give an
account of excuses. "Cedric intentionally burned the scrap
of paper; this serves to excuse his burning a valuable
document only because he did not know the scrap was the
uocument and because his burning the scrap was (identical
with) his burning the document." Davidson makes the same
point more explicitly elsewhere. To account for Jones'
excuse that 'I didn't know the gun was loaded' while admitting
pointing the gun and pulling the trigger, but denying
culpability for shooting the victim, Davidson thinks we should
appeal to the following "logical structure" of excusing: "i
admit I did .a, which is excusable. My excuse for doing b
rests upon my claim that I did not know that a=b " 4 Thus,
Jones admits to pointing the gun and pulling the trigger,
but he denies having known that his pointing the gun and
pulling the trigger would be the same as his shooting the
victim.
Davidson also claims that accounts of explanation and
causation require events. First, explanation:
Explanation, as already hinted, also seems to call
for events. Last week there was a catastrophe in
the village. In the course of explaining why it
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happened we need to redescribe it, perhaps as an
SrX;."*" ” "i.
And in the same passage he mentions causation:
^use
h
o? *L
nVlt^0n 'u in °nG WaY °r another ' theaus f the avalanche, we apparently claim thatthough we may not know such a description or such
' there must be descriptions of cause and
Hrue^af law"'^ deSCriPtio- instantiate
Davidson then adds a point about both explanation and causa-
tion. "All this talk of descriptions and redescriptions makes
sense, it would seem, only on the assumption that there are
bona fide entities to be described and redescribed."
As a fifth consideration in favor of particular events
Davidson suggests that the mere intelligibility of the Identity
Theory requires that there be events. He says, "A further
need for events springs from the fact that the most perspicuous
forms of the identity theory of mind require that we identify
mental events with certain physiological events; if such
theories or their denials are intelligible, events must be
individuals .
"
Finally, and most importantly, Davidson thinks that
without events it does not seem possible to give a
natural and acceptable account of the logical form
of certain sentences of the most common sort; it
does not seem possible, that is, to show how the
meanings of such sentences depend upon their composi-
tion .
The sorts of sentences Davidson has in mind are action
sentences, and the "natural and acceptable" account is the
one we considered in Chapters II and III. That is, Davidson
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thinks that his account of action sentences requires that
there be particular events.
2. Criticism of the Support
. Davidson speaks of the
six considerations of the last section as grounds for thinking
that events are particulars. I am not convinced that they are
compelling grounds in favor of particular events, but I shall
not discuss that here. The question I am interested in is
whether there is any reason for individuating events coarsely,
and, in particular, whether any of these considerations pro-
vide such a reason. Despite the fact that the topics of
action, excuses, explanation, and the Identity Theory are
well beyond the scope of this essay, so that we can discuss
none of them in detail, I think that we shall be able to
agree that none of the considerations Davidson presents
supports his view of event individuation.
Consider first what Davidson says about excuses. In
Davidson's example Jones admits to pointing the gun and
pulling the trigger but denies responsibility for shooting
the victim on the grounds that he did not know that the gun
was loaded. Davidson thinks that to understand this pattern
of excusing we should regard Jones as denying that he knew
that his pointing the gun and pulling the trigger would be
the same event as his shooting the victim, although in fact
they were the same event. We can accept this basic structure,
however, without admitting that the relation of identity
holds between the event of Jones' pointing the gun and
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pulling the trigger and the event of Jones' shooting the
victim. We could instead hold that by_ pointing the gun and
pulling the trigger Jones shot the victim. What Jones
claims to have been ignorant of, then, is that his shooting
the victim would have the by-relation to his pointing the
gun and pulling the trigger . 5 More needs to be said, of
course, about the nature of this by-relation, and more will
be said, below. For the moment it suffices to note that we
often do speak of doing one thing by doing another, for
example, opening the window by turning the knob, replenish-
ing the water supply by operating the pump, or turning on
the light by flipping the switch, and it seems plausible to
suppose that in such cases we assert that events of a certain
sort exist and are related by the by-relation.
Consider next Davidson's identification of Jones'
saying 'I apologize' with Jones' apologizing. There is some
plausibility to this identification. After all, when Jones
said, 'I apologize* he did not have to do anything else to
apologize. And anyone who heard Jones say 'I apologize'
would have heard him apologize. Nevertheless, I do not be-
lieve that this identification is forced upon us. If we
recognize that there is such a thing as a by-relation, we
do not have to identify Jones' apologizing with Jones'
saying 'I apologize' in order to understand the claim that
Jones apologized by saying 'I apologize'. Rather, we simply
say that there is an event of Jones' apologizing and an
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event of Jones' saying 'I apologize', and the former bears
the by-relation to the latter. Thus, Davidson's first
consideration does not seem to require that events be
individuated coarsely.
It is less clear to me how Davidson's third and fourth
considerations bear on the question of event individuation.
If the point simply is that accounts of explanation and
causation require description and redescription of events,
then it does not count in favor of coarse-grained events.
For fine-grained events can be described. And they can be
redescribed
,
as well; for example, ’Brutus and Caesar stand-
ing in the relation of stabbing at t' and 'Kim's most-cited
event might be two descriptions of the same fine-grained
event.
Perhaps, instead, the point is something like the fol-
lowing. Suppose that an explanation of an event e is a
deductive argument such that 1) its premiss set is the union
of a set, C, of propositions stating various matters of fact
and standing conditions, and a set, L, of propositions
stating various causal laws, 2) its conclusion is the
proposition that e occurred, and 3) the conclusion is not
deducible from C or L alone. Suppose, then, that we want
to explain the catastrophe in the village. What we will
have to do is find a set, C, of propositions describing the
situation just before the catastrophe. This set will contain,
among others, propositions detailing the condition of the
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snow on the slope above the village. (The catastrophe, re-
call, was an avalanche). We will also have to find a set,
L, of law-like propositions such that from them and the set
C of conditions we can deduce that the catastrophe occurred.
But it is unlikely that we can find laws relating snow condi-
tions to the occurrence of a catastrophe. We would be more
likely to succeed if we tried to find laws relating snow
conditions to the occurrence of an avalanche. Thus, if we
want to explain the catastrophe, we should first redescribe
it as an avalanche, and then find an explanation for an
avalanche occurring. in sum, if we want to explain the
catastrophe we must identify it with the occurrence of an
avalanche, and this amounts to coarse-grained identification
of events.
Perhaps that is how explanation might be supposed to re-
quire coarse-grained event individuation. But this line of
reasoning is unconvincing. Apart from claiming that the
above account of explanation is inadequate (it is)
,
someone
who individuated events finely could nevertheless agree that
the catastrophe is identical to the occurrence of an avalanche
For example, Kim could consistently hold that the avalanche
occurring is the mountain having the property of having an
avalanche (at a time t) and that this event is the catastrophe
Of course Kim could not also consistently hold that the
catastrophe is identical to the mountain having the property
of there being a catastrophe at t, but there is no reason
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why he should want to.
Perhaps the claim about explanation can be modified to
yield an example of an identification which the fine-grained
theorist cannot accept. Suppose we find sets C and L of
propositions which explain the avalanche occurring. Pre-
sumably the proposition that the avalanche covering the
village occurred is not derivable from the union of C and
L, for the laws included in L might be supposed to relate
snow conditions to avalanches, saying nothing about villages.
Now, Davidson might suggest, we can explain the avalanche
covering the village occurring only if we identify it with
the avalanche occurring, for we can explain the latter. In
this case the defender of fine-grained event individuation
will surely deny that the avalanche occurring is the same
as the avalanche covering the village occurring.
Nevertheless, the defender of fine-grained event in-
dividuation need not despair. He can agree that the proposi-
tion that the avalanche covering the village occurred is not
deducible from the union of C and L, and so the union of C
and L is not an explanans for the avalanche covering the
village occurring. But he can also claim that there is some
other explanans for this event. He can suggest adding to
the set C some propositions relating the location of the
snow-covered slopes to the location of the village and
adding to the set L some law-like proposition to the effect
that whenever a (sufficiently large) avalanche falls from a
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slope so related to a (sufficiently small) village, the
avalanche covers the village. The new explanans does ex-
plain the avalanche covering the village occurring, and so
that event need not be identified with the avalanche occurring
in order to explain it. I am not sure that this is how
Davidson's remarks about explanation were intended to bear
on the question of event individuation, but I think that we
can agree that the argument we just outlined, albeit sketchily,
does not support coarse-grained individuation, and I can think
of no other way in which an account of explanation might re-
quire individuating events coarsely.
Davidson's remarks about causation are also difficult
to apply to event individuation. Apparently the view of
causation he has in mind is one according to which if an
event e_ causes an event e' then there are descriptions D
and D' such that D picks out e, D' picks out e', and op
causes D' n insantiates a true causal law. Davidson then
says that "this talk of descriptions and redescriptions
makes sense... only on the assumption that there are bona
fide entities to be described and redescribed." We have al-
ready noted that fine-grained events can be described and
redescribed as well as coarse-grained events. In fact,
these remarks do not even seem to support Davidson's claim
that events are particulars . For universals can be described
and redescribed, for example, by 'The Good' and 'Plato's
favorite Form*
.
I am unable to see how Davidson's remarks
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about causation might be construed so as to support coarse-
grained event individuation.
Davidson's claim that the intelligibility of the
Identity Theory requires events also seems to provide no
\
special reason for preferring coarse-grained events, for
the Identity Theory can be intelligibly stated in terms of
fine-grained events, as it has been by Kim . 7 One disadvantage
of Kim's version of the Identity Theory is that for it to be
true, that is, for mental events to be identical with physical
events, mental properties
,
like being in pain, have to be
identical to physical properties, like having C-fiber stimula-
tion. Since it is unlikely that such properties are identical,
or even co-extensive, it is unlikely that Kim's version of
the Identity Theory is true. But Davidson has in this con-
text made no claims about the truth of the theory, only its
intelligibility. On the other hand, Davidson might be able
to argue that the truth of the Identity Theory requires
coarse-grained events. Since, however, the truth of the
Identity Theory is disputed, this would not make a very
convincing argument.
Davidson clearly thinks that his account of the logical
form of action sentences provides a powerful and important
support for his theory of events. Moreover, it is clear
that Davidson's account of action sentences i_s incompatible
with an extremely fine-grained approach to event individuation.
Consider
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(1) Jones shot the victim with a gun.
Davidson's treatment of (1) is as
(!') (Ex) (Shot (Jones, the victim, x) & With (a gun, x) )
,
that is, there is an event which is a shooting by Jones of
the victim and that event is with a gun. Any such event is
also, of course, a shooting by Jones of the victim. So
Davidson's account of action sentences requires the identifi-
cation of Jones' shooting the victim with Jones' shooting the
victim with a gun. But that is incompatible with Kim's view,
since according to him no single event is both a shooting by
Jones of the victim and also a shooting by Jones of the
victim with a gun, since Jones and the victim exemplifying
the relation expressed by 'x shoots £' is distinct from Jones
and the victim exemplifying the relation expressed by 'x
shoots y with a gun'
.
Although Davidson's account of the logical form of
action sentences provides for the identification of some
events, it offers no general reason for preferring the ex-
tremely coarse-grained individuation favored by Davidson.
In particular, Davidson's translation of
(2) Jones shot the victim
and
(3) Jones pointed the gun and pulled the trigger
as
(2') (Ex) (Shot (Jones
,
the victim, x)
)
and
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respectively, provides no logical reason for identifying
Jones’ shooting the victim with Jones' pointing the gun and
pulling the trigger. Yet this identification is, as we have
seen, one that Davidson wishes to make.
Finally, if the claims made in Chapter III are correct,
Davidson's treatment of action sentences can provide no
reason for individuating events coarsely, since I there
argued that Davidson's account of action sentences is in-
adequate. Thus, I conclude that none of the considerations
we have examined provides any reason to think that events are
coarse-grained rather than fine-grained.
3. Davidson ' s Condition of Event Identity. In "The
Individuation of Events" Davidson considers several con-
ditions of event identity. He suggests some necessary con-
ditions of event identity: where x and y_ are events, f
x=y then x and
y_ occur at the same time? if x=y_ then x and
Y_ occur at the same place; if x=£ than any substance in which
x is a change,
^
is a change, and any substance in which y
is a change, x is a change. He is tempted to regard the
first two of these as jointly sufficient conditions of event
identity, as well. But he finally settles on the following
condition
:
(DI) x=£ if and only if ( (z.) ( caused x -4 caused y_)
and (z) (x caused z^
y_ caused z) ) ,
where x and are events.
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Davidson does not say how to interpret the arrow. i
suppose that the two conditionals on the right-hand side
are material conditionals. One consequence of this inter-
pretation is that if (DI) is correct there is at most one
event that is both uncaused and inefficacious. This conse-
quence is certainly unobjectionable to someone who believes
that all events are caused. Kim, however, has recently
argued 8 that not all events are caused. Xanthippe's becoming
a widow, for example, was, according to Kim, determined by
Socrates' dying, but Xanthippe's becoming a widow was not
caused by Socrates' dying or by any other event. If those
events which, according to Kim are uncaused do not them-
selves cause any other events, then (DI) is clearly un-
acceptable for Kim. Although Kim does not say, it seems
likely that his uncaused but determined events are them-
selves causes. For, example, Xanthippe's becoming a widow
may have caused her becoming lonely, or it may have caused
her putting the house up for sale. If so, then although
Kim thinks that there is more than one uncaused event, he
need not be understood as holding that there is more than
one event which is both uncaused and inefficacious. Thus,
he might not find (DI) objectionable on that count.
We should expect Kim to find (DI) unacceptable on
other grounds, however. For if (DI) really does individuate
events to Davidson's satisfaction, then it individuates them
coarsely. But does (DI) individuate events coarsely? We
might first note that havi
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ng all and only the same causes
and effects is surely a necessary condition of event
identity—necessary because it is a consequence of the
principle of the indiscernibility of identicals. So, of
course, identical events have the same causal properties.
Goldman, however, has claimed that events which
Davidson identifies differ both with respect to their
causes and their effects
.
9
Let us examine how this charge
might be supported. Consider first the claim that events
which Davidson identifies have different effects. Accord-
ing to a story told by Miss Anscombe, a man (intentionally)
operates a pump, replenishes the water supply of a house,
and poisons its inhabitants
.
10 Now clearly on Davidson's
view and given the facts of the story, just one event has
been picked out. The man's operating the pump is the same
as his replenishing the water supply, which is the same as
his poisoning the inhabitants. But if there is just one
event here, and if (DI) is correct, then the man's operating
the pump has the same effects as the man's replenishing the
water supply and the man's poisoning the inhabitants. We
may suppose that the man's operating the pump causes a
clicking of the valves of the pump. But, according to the
objector, it seems false to say that the man's replenishing
the water supply or his poisoning the inhabitants causes
the clicking of the valves.
Davidson is not without a reply, however. For he can
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deny that the man's replenishing the water supply and his
poisoning the inhabitants do not cause the clicking of the
valves. After all, he can say, if events are seriously
taken as coarse-grained, concrete entities, then it is
clear that there is just one event variously described as
an operating of the pump, a replenishing of the water
supply, and a poisoning of the inhabitants; and it is that
event which caused the clicking of the valves.
Let us try another example. Suppose that on some
particular occasion Jones sings loudly and off-key. Then
Davidson would identify the events of Jones' singing, Jones
singing loudly, and Jones' singing off-key. Let us suppose
that Jones' singing off-key causes his voice teacher to
become angry. The objector will maintain, however, that
Jones' singing loudly did not cause his voice teacher to
become angry. He might explain that Jones was supposed to
sing loudly, and he might cite the voice teacher's remark,
I didn't mind his singing loudly; it was his singing off-
key that bothered me."
Again, Davidson can reply. If events are concrete
particulars
,
and the event of Jones' singing just is the
event of Jones' singing loudly and the event of Jones'
singing off-key, then it is that event which caused the
teacher s becoming angry. The relevant aspect of the event
of John's singing was that it was off-key. Talk of
relevant aspects might be misleading, however. It is not
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the aspect of being off-key, nor is it the property of being
off-key, that caused the teacher's becoming angry, according
to Davidson. For Davidson takes causation to be a relation
between events, not between aspects (whatever they are) or
properties and events. Similarly, unless Jones' singing's
having the property of being off-key is an event, it is not
the cause of the teacher's becoming angry. So what, then,
does it mean to say that being off-key is the relevant
aspect of Jones' singing relative to the teacher's becoming
angry? I think that one way in which Davidson might try to
answer this question is to note that Jones' singing off-key
is relevant to an explanation of the teacher's becoming
angry, in a way in which Jones' singing or his singing loudly
is not relevant. At the end of his paper "Causal Relations" 1
there is a hint as to how Davidson might develop this sug-
gestion. There he says that although the word 'cause' is
typically used to express a relation holding between events,
in sentences like 'The collapse was caused, not by the fact
that the bolt gave way, but by the fact that it gave way so
suddenly and unexpectedly', the word 'cause' expresses a
relation holding between statements . This latter relation,
he says, might be better expressed by the words 'causally
explain'. Thus, according to Davidson, we are inclined to
treat
(4) The fact that the bolt gave way suddenly and
unexpectedly caused the collapse
as true
,
and
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( 5 ) The fact that the bol t gave way caused the collapse
as false
,
in the case imagined, because (4) and (5) are to
be understood, respectively, as
(4') The statement that the bolt gave way suddenly
and unexpectedly causally explains the collapse,
which is true, and
(5') The statement that the bolt gave way causally
explains the collapse,
which is false. It is difficult to understand Davidson's
claim that explanations relate statements and not events
since in (4') and (5') 'causally explains' seems to relate
a statement and an event. Ignoring this point, let us see
whether we can construct a rebuttal to the objection of the
last paragraph.
f
We were considering, in effect, a case in which
(6) Jones' singing off-key caused the teacher's becoming
angry
was true
,
and
(7) Jones' singing loudly caused the teacher's becoming
angry
was alleged to be false. If 'caused' in (6) and (7) ex-
presses a relation between events and the truth values of
(6) and (7) are as claimed, it follows that Jones' singing
off-key is distinct from Jones' singing loudly. Now perhaps
Davidson would say that someone who believes that (6) is
true and (7) is false does so because in them 'caused' ex-
presses a relation between a statement and an event. But
what statement does 'caused' take in its first place in (6)?
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Surely, not 'Jones' singing off-key', for that is not a
statement. Perhaps we are to supply one, although it is
not clear how to do so in general. We might try rephrasing
(6) and (7) as
(6') The statement that Jones sang off-key causally
explains the teacher's becoming angry
and
(7') The statement that Jones sang loudly causally
explains the teacher's becoming angry.
Maybe Davidson would say that when someone thinks that (6) is
true and (7) is false it is through understanding them as (6')
and (7'), respectively. But this does not appear to be right.
In the first place, (6') does not seem to be true. The
statement that Jones sang off-key would surely play some
role in an explanation of what caused the teacher's becoming
angry, but it does not by itself explain the teacher's anger.
We need in addition to be told, among other things, that Jones
is a student of the teacher, that the teacher is a voice
teacher, and that the teacher had expected Jones to sing on
pitch. Davidson would not be open to this criticism i f by
'causally explains' he means 'would enter into a causal ex-
planation of', but then in the previous case (5') would be
true, contrary to hypothesis. For the statement that the
bolt gave way would surely enter into a causal explanation
of the collapse, even though that statement does not by
itself explain the collapse. Moreover, we do not seem to
mean (6') when we assert (6). It is plausible, for example.
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to argue from (6) to its existential generalization
i f) ) (Ee) (e caused the teacher’s becoming angry)
,
where e is an event and 'caused' expresses a relation
holding only between events.
But Davidson need not insist that there is any confusion
about (6) in making his rebuttal. He can admit that (6),
understood in the sense in which it entails (6'') by ex-
\
istential generalization, is true. He should also claim
that (7) is true. He might then add that the objector mis-
takenly thinks that (7) is false because he confuses it
with the admittedly false (7')
.
This line of reasoning does
not seem to me to be very convincing, however, unless we
assume that Jones' singing off-key is identical to his sing-
ing loudly. A more detailed account of the alleged ambiguity
would certainly improve Davidson's case. Before drawing any
conclusion, let us briefly consider the claim that events
which Davidson identifies have different causes.
Consider again Jones' singing loudly and Jones' singing
off-key. On Davidson's view of action it might be that
Jones' singing loudly was caused by his desire to please
. 1
3
his teacher, but, according to the objector, Jones' singing
off-key was caused instead by his having a cold, which did
not cause his singing loudly. Thus, it would appear that
Jones' singing loudly and his singing off-key have different
causes. Again, Davidson could reply that one ought to keep
in mind that events are coarse-grained particulars. Since
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Jones’ singing loudly just is Jones' singing off-key, what-
ever caused the one caused the other. Since the event is
complex (in some unspecified sense)
,
there must have been
a number of factors which contributed to its being th way
it was. Jones' cold, for example, contributed to his sing-
ing's being off-key.
While I am sympathetic to the claim that events which
Davidson identifies differ with respect to their causes and
effects, I do not think that the claim is convincing enough
o constitute a refutation of Davidson's theory. For David-
son can consistently deny that events, like those cited
above, when conceived coarsely differ in their causes or
effects. Nevertheless, the following weaker claim seems to
me to be correct. Acceptance of Davidson's principle (DI)
does not commit one to a coarse-grained view of events. For
if one begins with a fine-grained theory of events, then
events like Jones' singing loudly and his singing off-key do
have different causes and effects.
In Section 2 of this chapter I tried to show that the
positive considerations which Davidson urged in support of
his theory of events do not in fact establish that events
are coarsely individuated. In the present section I have
tried to show that Davidson's principle of event identity
does not require coarse-grained individuation, either. I
turn now to more direct criticisms of Davidson's theory of
events
.
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4. An Objection Involving Time . In this section and
the two following I shall consider three objections to
Davidson's theory of events. The first objection is put
by Goldman as follows:
Suppose that John shoots George at noon but George
does not die of his wounds until midnight. It is
true that John killed George and that he killed
him by shooting him; but is the killing the same
as the shooting? Though it is clear that George's
death occurs twelve hours after John shoots him,
it seems false to say that George's death occurs
twelve hours after John kills him. But if the death
follows the shooting, but not the killing by twelve
^hours, the shooting and the killing must be distinct.
The difficulty is quite general, although often the time
difference is so small as to be unnoticeable . Thus, the
cartridge explodes slightly after Jones pulls the trigger.
i
Does the cartridge explode after Jones fires the gun? If
not, Jones' pulling the trigger is distinct from his firing
the gun. Jones pushes the plunger. Later the dynamite ex-
plodes. Does Jones' blasting occur before the dynamite ex-
plodes? If not, Jones' blasting is distinct from his pushing
the plunger. Jones puts a pan of cake batter in an automatic
oven. Is Jones' baking a cake over then? If so, it is done
before the cake is.
Davidson accepts the consequence of identifying John's
1 s
shooting George with John's killing George. If George died
twelve hours later, then John killed him twelve hours efore
he died. Davidson suggests that we reconcile ourselves to
this conclusion. Toward that end he distinguishes between
describing an event in terms of its terminal state, as his
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painting the barn red', the referent of which is not over
until he has finished painting the barn, and describing an
event in terms of one of its effects. Davidson thinks that
to describe an event as a killing is to describe it as an
event which has a death as an effect, that is, a killing is
an event which causes someone's death.
But is there any reason to think that when we call an
event a killing we merely mean that it is an event that caused
a death? For one thing, not all events which cause deaths
are killings. In fact, not even all actions which cause a
death are killings, since someone can cause someone's death
by having them killed. Moreover, negligent homicide seems
to afford examples of someone killing someone without doing
anything which causes the death. If I stood idly by while a
train slowly approached the victim sleeping on the tracks, I
might properly be said to have killed the victim, although no
action of mine caused his death. My standing there did not
cause his death; rather, the train's running over him did.
Finally, it seems clear that 'John killed George' entails
1
6
'George is dead', yet on Davidson's view the former could
be true while the latter is false, for a while, anyway.
Thus, it seems as though Davidson is mistaken in identifying
John's shooting George with John's killing George.
I do not think, however, that Goldman's objection is
persuasive. For consider the alternatives to holding that
John's killing George occurred at the same time as John's
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shooting George. It seems to me that there are three al-
ternatives. One is to say that John's killing of George
occurred at the same time as George's dying. Another is
to say that the time of John’s killing George was the entire
period commencing at the same time as John's shooting George
began and ending at the same time as George's dying ended
.
17
Finally
,
one could say that there is no time at which (or
throughout which) John's killing of George occurred, that
some events occur but not at any time.
None of these alternatives seems particularly attractive.
Perhaps the last one accords best with common sense. If we
were asked when John killed George we might reply that it was
last year, or last September, or the first week of September.
But if we were pressed for more and more precise answers, we
would ultimately reject the question and instead explain that
John shot George at one time and that George did not die until
another time, twelve hours later. This is some evidence that
we would ordinarily refrain from assigning a time to John's
killing George. But the concept of an event like John's
killing George and the task of assigning times to such events
are both technical. Our ordinary intuitions ought not be
supposed to tell us how to determine the time of John's
killing George any more than they ought be supposed to tell
us what an event is. The most we can hope for is that our
ordinary intuitions motivate and illuminate our philosophical
claims. It seems to me to be philosophically neater to think
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that for every event (which occurs) there is a time at which
it occurs. For this reason the third alternative above ought
to be rejected. if we reject it, then our philosophical
concept of an event begins to diverge from our preanalytic
concept. Moreover, it is not surprising that any attempt
to fix the time of John's killing George will conflict with
our ordinary intuitions, given that we would ordinarily re-
frain from assigning a time to it. What I intend to do here
is to show that the only alternatives to Davidson's treatment
of the time of a killing that seem to me to be at all
reasonable also conflict with our intuitions. The conclusion
to be drawn, I think, is that Davidson's attempt to fix the
time of John's killing George is no more suspect than any
other. And thus, Goldman's criticism of Davidson in uncon-
vincing.
Consider the second alternative, that John's killing
George occurred throughout the entire period beginning with
John's shooting George and ending with George's dying. This
suggestion has some plausibility in the analogous case of
Jones' baking a cake. If Jones puts a pan of cake batter in
an oven, it is somewhat plausible to suppose that Jones'
baking a c$ke takes the entire time that the cake is in the
oven, and r^ot just the time that it takes Jones to puL the
pan in the oven and turn it on. Even if we suppose that
the oven is self-timing, so that there is nothing Jones need
do to bake ,the cake beyond putting the batter in the oven
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and turning the oven on, it is tempting to say that Jones'
baking the cake took the entire time that the cake baked.
This bring the analogy closer to John's killing of George.
If John's aim was good, there was nothing he had to do ex-
cept shoot George to ensure that his killing of George
would occur. Thomson considers someone (called 'A') who
melts some chocolate by flipping the switch of an electric
19heater. She notes that if the heater took a while to heat
up, it would be true right after A flipped the switch to say
that A had flipped the switch, but false to say that A had
melted the chocolate. She takes this as evidence that at
that time A's flipping the switch had occurred and that A's
melting the chocolate had not occurred (that is, had at least
not finished occurring.)
There seems to me, however, to be an important objection
to taking as the time of John's killing George the entire span
including the times of his shooting George and George's dying.
Moreover, the same objection applies to the first alternative
above, that is, taking John's killing George to occur at
exactly the same time as George's dying. It seems clear
that 'John's killing George is occurring' entails 'John is
killing George*. Suppose then, that immediately after
shooting George, John turns the gun on himself and dies
instantly. As before, we assume that George does not die
until twelve hours later. If John's killing George occurs
throughout the entire interval beginning with the shooting
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and ending with the dying, or if John's killing of George
occurs at the same time as the dying, then there will be
times after John's death and before George's is over such
that at those times 'John's killing of George is occurring'
is true and ’John is killing George' is false. But that is
impossible, if the entailment noted above holds. So the
first two alternatives are unpalatable as well.
I do not pretend to have a solution to the problem of
what time John's killing of George occurred. Given that
the alternatives to saying that John's killing of George
occurred at the same time as John's shooting of George are
so unattractive, it is unconvincing to attack Davidson for
identifying John's shooting of George with John's killing
of George on the grounds that these events occurred at
different times. If a successful objection is one that is
not only true, but convincing as well, then this objection
to Davidson is unsuccessful.
5. An Objection Involving Place . Another objection to
Davidson's coarse-grained individuation of events is that
events which Davidson identifies seem to occur at different
places. 20 Before giving the objection in more detail, let
us look at how events are located. It is certainly not al-
ways easy to locate events. Vaguely, events seem to occur
where the objects that figure in them are. Thus, if John
kisses Mary, the event of John's kissing Mary is located
where John and Mary are at the time of their kissing.
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Davidson shares this intuition and suggests the following
principle: "the location of [an] event at a moment is the
location of the smallest part of the substance a change in
which is identical with the event ." 21
This principle is extremely unclear. Suppose that I
cut my finger. Then my cutting my finger is a change in me.
So the location of my cutting my finger is the location of
the smallest part of me. Suppose that the smallest part of
me is a particular atom in my pituitary gland. Then ac-
cording to this principle, the location of my cutting my
finger is wherever that atom in my pituitary gland is. But
this is absurd. My cutting my finger occurred in at least
the space occupied by my finger. Moreover, why suppose that
if an event is a change in a substance that there is a unique
substance a change in which is identical to the event? But
that is what the principle requires. Suppose I cut my finger
in the kitchen. In which substance is this event a change?
Plausible candidates include my finger, my hand, me, and
the kitchen.
Davidson could perhaps avoid the first of these ob-
jections by revising the principle so that the location of
an event is the location of the smallest part of a substance
a change in which part is identical to the event; and he
could avoid the second objection by allowing that the loca-
tion of an event is determined by the location of any
substance a change in whose part is identical with the event.
q 9
Perhaps, if whenever an event is a change in a part of more
than one substance, each such part overlaps all the others,
then the revised principle is acceptable. For example, my
finger's being cut is a change in a part of my finger, and
it is a change in a part of my hand, but the smallest part
of my finger in which it is a change occupies exactly the
same space as the smallest part of my hand in which it is
a change, and it is that space, according to the revised
principle, where my finger's being cut is located.
We might note that the principle gives the location of
an event art a moment . If an event occurs throughout an
interval of time, it might be located in different places
at different instants. Thus, if Boris strolls in Bologna
\
some evening, his strolling might be found on Via Rizzoli
at eight o'clock and on Via Zamboni at nine o'clock.
I do not know if the revised principle is acceptable.
In particular, it is not obvious to me that an event cannot
be a change in disjoint smallest parts of distinct substances.
In fact, it seems likely that on Davidson's coarse-grained
view of events, it will often be the case that an event is
a change in parts of more than one thing where the parts
occupy different spaces. But let us turn to the objection
to Davidson's method of event individuation. Recall that
in the passage quoted at the beginning of this chapter
Davidson identified the event of my pointing the gun and
pulling the trigger with the event of my shooting the
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victim. Now the space where the smallest part of those
substances a change in whose parts is my pointing the gun
and pulling the trigger is clearly at most the space where
the gun and I are. But the space where the smallest part
of any substance a change in which part is my shooting the
victim is at least the space occupied by the victim (or at
least that part of him that is struck by the bullet)
. Given
that I am not the victim, the locations of the two events
are different, and so they are two events. I have stated
the objection in Davidson-like language, but I need not
have. My pointing the gun and pulling the trigger occurs
in the space where the gun and I are. My shooting the victim
occurs in the space where the victim and I are. Since the
spaces are different, the events are different. Similar
considerations show that my flipping the switch is distinct
from my illuminating the room, and both of these are distinct
from my alerting the prowler. Thus, I think that we can see
that several events which Davidson identifies occur at dif-
ferent places, and so they are in fact distinct.
6. An Objection Involving the By-Relation . A final
objection to Davidson's coarse-grained approach to events is
22due to Goldman, who notes a certain asymmetry between
events which Davidson identifies. For it might be true,
let us suppose, that
(8) John shot George by pointing the gun and pulling
the trigger,
but it is false that
10
(9)
John pointed the gun and pulled the trigger by
shooting George.
To see how this makes a problem for Davidson, let us first
make the simplifying assumption that
(10) John shot George exactly once and John pointed
the gun and pulled the trigger exactly once.
What (8) amounts to, according to a Davidson-like paraphrase,
is
(8') (EX) (Ey) ( (x is a shooting of George by John) & (y
is a pointing the gun and pulling the trigger by
John) & (By(x,y))).
If we assume, as Davidson does, that
(11) John's shooting George is identical to John's
pointing the gun and pulling the trigger,
then we may conclude from (11) and (10) that
(12) (x) (x is a shooting of George by John if and only
if x is a pointing the gun and pulling the trigger
by John)
.
But now (12) and (8') entail
(9') (Ex) (Ey) ( (x is a pointing the gun and pulling the
trigger by John) & (^ is a shooting of George by
John) & (By (x
,y_) ) ) .
However, (9') is the Davidson-like paraphrase of (9), which
is false. So (9') is false. But if ( 9 '
)
is false, then so
is (11). Thus, Davidson's identification of John's shooting
George with John's pointing the gun and pulling the trigger
is mistaken.
One reply to this argument is to question whether (8')
is in fact a Davidsonian paraphrase of (8). There is good
10 2
evidence, however, to think that it is. In "Causal Relation" 23
Davidson translates
(13) Jack fell down, which caused it to be the case thatJack broke his crown '
as
(13 ) There exists event e^ and e' such that e is a
falling down of Jack, e' ITs a breaking~of his
crown by Jack, and e caused e'.
Similarly, he treats
(14) Jack fell down before Jack broke his crown
as
(14') There exist events e and e' such that e is a
falling down of Jack, e“ is a breaking of his
crown by Jack, and e preceded e'.
It would only be natural to treat (8) similarly, that is,
as ( 8 ' ) .
Another possible reply is to question whether there is
such a thing as a by-relation. After all, we know very little
about it except that it holds between events and is alleged
to be irreflexive and asymmetric. Is it also transitive?
Goldman suggests that it is. Thomson proposes the following
24definition
:
(TB) By(x,y_) {z) (x causes z_ o %_ causes z)
One drawback of (TB) is that it allows that the by-relation
be reflexive. Perhaps this is unobjectionable, but it can
be avoided by adding '& x^y_“ to the definiens. Is (TB) ac-
ceptable? I am not sure. As Thomson herself notes, in
effect, it is not obvious that there are no pairs of distinct
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events satisfying ' <z) (x causes z o z causes z) ' which do not
also satisfy
(15) (S) (S does S does x by doing yj
But any pair which satisfies 'By(x,£)' must also satisfy ( 15 ).
Nevertheless
,
even if (TB) does not define the by-relation, we
do have a strong inclination to believe that (8) is true and
(9) is false. In lieu of any alternative explanation of
these sentences, it seems reasonable to treat them on the
model of (8') and (9'), that is, as involving the by-relation,
however that relation may finally be analyzed. We are justi-
fied in concluding, then, that not only is Davidson's positive
support of his theory of events inadequate, but that his
theory is beset with serious difficulties.
7. Appendix : " Under a Description "
. Twice in earlier
25
chapters I have postponed discussing Davidson's claims that
actions are intentional "under a description" and that
actions are explained only "under a description". In "Eternal
vs. Ephemeral Events" Davidson tries to explain his use of
the expression "intentional under a description". He suggests
the following:
It was intentional of Oedipus that there was an event
that was his striking of the old man at the crossroads.
But though that event was identical with his striking
his father, it was not intentional of Oedipus that
there was an event identical with his striking his
father. We may harmlessly compress the point by say-
ing: the striking of the old man was intentional
under one description but not under another. This
does not mean that the event did and did not have a
certain property, but that the event, Oedipus, and a
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certain description, have a relation that does not
obtain, between the same event, Oedipus, and a different description. 2 '
Davidson tries to motivate this manner of speaking in two
ways. He notes first that " [p]art of the point... of speak
-
iny of an action or event 'under a description* is merely
to make explicit the fact that some context is intensional.
"
For example, from
(16) It was intentional of Oedipus that there was an
event that was his striking the old man
and
(17) the old man = his father >
we cannot infer
(18) It was intentional of Oedipus that there was an
event that was his striking his father.
Substitutivity of identicals breaks down in (16)
,
and it is
this fact to which Davidson wishes to call attention when he
says that Oedipus' striking the old man was intentional under
the description 'Oedipus' striking the old man' but not under
the description 'Oedipus' striking his father*. So far, so
good. Substitutivity of identicals does break down in con-
texts like that of (16)
,
and it is no doubt worthwhile to
emphasize this fact.
But Davidson goes on:
The remainder of the point depends on the mixed nature
of certain attributions of attitude or intent: ex-
amples are knowing, acting intentionally, perceiving
that something is the case, remembering, and being
pleased that something is the case. At one time Oedipus
was pleased to be married to Jocasta. It follows that
he was married to Jocasta; and since Jocasta was his
mother, that he was married to his mother. But he was
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not pleased that he was married to his mother.
'Oedipus was pleased that he was married to
Jocasata' thus expresses a relation between
Oedipus and Jocasta, but the truth of the
sentence depends on Jocasta' s being described
in one way rather than another. It is natural,
therefore, to think of the sentence as expressing
a relation between Oedipus, Jocasta, and a certain
description of Jocasta. In explaining why Oedipus
was pleased, we might want to make explicit reference
to the description of Jocasta under which he was
pleased to be married to her. 25*
A couple of things about this passage are puzzling. First,
Davidson says that (19) "thus expresses a relation between
Oedipus and Jocasta." This remark is puzzling, because in
the next sentence Davidson says that (19) also asserts that
a certain three-place relation holds. What relation does
(19) assert to hold between Oedipus and Jocasta? One pos-
sibility is that it is the relation expressed by 1 x was
pleased that he was married to y ' We might be tempted, how-
30
ever, to think that this open sentence expresses no relation.
Given the truth of (19) and
(21) Jocasta = his mother,
it does not follow that
(22) Oedipus was pleased that he was married to his
mother.
But if permitting substitution of co-designative singular
terms is a necessary condition of a context's expressing a
property? then the above open sentence does not express a
property. It would be a mistake to draw this conclusion,
though; for *x was pleased that he was married to is
ambiguous. On one reading it creates an opaque context on
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its right. On another reading it does not. On this second
reading it expresses a relation de re between the pleased
and the one to whom the pleased is pleased to be married.
Normally understood, (22) includes an instantiation of the
opaque version of 'x was pleased that he was married to y ' .
There is another interpretation of (22) that includes an
instantiation of the extensional version of the same open
sentence; however, this interpretation would normally be
expressed by something like the more perspicuous
(22*) His mother is such that Oedipus was pleased to be
married to her .
So perhaps when Davidson says that (19) expresses a relation
between Oedipus and Jocasta, the relation he has in mind is
the one expressed by the extensional version of 'x was pleased
that he was married to y_' . On the other hand, maybe he in-
tends something fancier, like the relation expressed by 'x
r
was pleased that he was married to y_ under the description
r if
'Jocasta''. While I have an idea of what the extension of
this predicate is, I have no idea as to what its intension
is. I turn, however, to a matter of more immediate concern.
Davidson's main claim in the above passage is, I take
it, that (19) ought to be treated as predicating a three-
place relation of Oedipus, Jocasta, and the name 'Jocasta',
that is, as
(19*) x was pleased that he was married to y_ under
description (Oedipus, Jocasta, 'Jocasta').
Let us abbreviate 'x was pleased that he was married to £
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under description • as 'Dplease'. Then Davidson's point is
that (19) can be represented as
( 19 '') Dplease (Oedipus
, Jocasta, 'Jocasta').
Given the three-place predicate 'Dplease' and the facts
of the case
, Davidson can note that (19") in conjunction
with (21) entails
(23) Dplease (Oedipus
,
his mother, 'Jocasta'),
which is, therefore, also true. (it is read 'Oedipus was
pleased that he was married to his mother under the description
'Jocasta'.) Davidson can also interpret (22) as
( 32 ') Dplease (Oedipus
,
his mother, 'his mother').
Now (22') is false, but that is all right, since it is not
entailed by (19") and (21).
If we accept this interpretation of (19) and (22)
,
then
presumably we will be willing to interpret
(16) It was intentional of Oedipus that there was an
event that was his striking of the old man
in an analogous fashion as
(16') It was intentional of x that there was an event
identical to y under description ot (Oedipus,
Oedipus' striking of the old man, 'Oedipus'
striking of the old man').
But without taking this additional step, let us ask whether
Davidson's treatment of (19) as (19") is plausible. First,
there is one respect in which Davidson's approach is mis-
leading. One might be tempted to think that the relevant
description of Jocasta under which Oedipus was pleased to
be married to her should be a description that Oedipus had
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in mind or might have used. But that is not Davidson's
view. Oedipus never had the descriptions 'Jocasta' or
'his mother' in mind, although he may have had in mind
their Greek translations. Deciding which descriptions are
relevant might be a problem for Davidson, but there is a
more serious difficulty with his account, to which I now
turn
.
There is, it seems to me
,
a decisive reason for re-
jecting (19'') as a paraphrase of (19). It is, simply,
that since 'Dplease* yields extensional contexts, (19'')
entails
(24) There is a description 'Jocasta'
,
whereas (19) does not. If there were no attractive alterna-
tive account, then Davidson might try to argue that we are
just ignorant of the linguistic facts entailed by (19) . But
there are alternatives. Here is one: Distinguish
(25) (Ex) (x = Jocasta & Oedipus was pleased that he
married x)
from
(26) Oedipus was pleased that (Ex) (x = Jocasta & he
married x)
.
Note that (25) but not (26) in conjunction with (21) entails
(27) (Ex) (x = his mother & Oedipus was pleased that he
married x)
Even given (21) neither (25) , (26) , nor (27) entails
(28) Oedipus was pleased that (Ex) (x = his mother & he
married x)
Note finally, that under appropriate assumptions (25), (26),
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and (27) are true, (28) is false, (26) translates a common
reading of (19), and (27) translates a common reading of (22)
There seems to be no reason why this account, familiar
from treatments of the propositional attitudes of knowledge
and belief cannot be extended to handle the intensional
contexts created by 'It is intentional that...'. I conclude
thau there are problems with talk of action "under a
description" and that Davidson has not dissolved these
problems
.
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CHAPTER V
CHISHOLM'S THEORY OF EVENTS AS STATES OF AFFAIRS
In several recent papers 1 Roderick Chisholm has pre-
sented and defended a theory of states of affairs. In
terms of this theory he has attempted to do at least three
things. First, he has tried to give a theory of events and
propositions according to which these latter kinds of
entities are species of states of affairs. Second, Chisholm
has also tried to give a relational theory of time according
to which talk of instants of time can be reduced to talk of
the occurrence or non-occurrence of states of affairs.
Finally, Chisholm has tried to show how talk of particular
occurrences ) of states of affairs can be interpreted in such
a way so as not to be committed to particular states of
affairs or concrete events, in addition to "generic" states
of affairs. In this chapter I shall be concerned with the
first and the third of these enterprises. In the first
three sections I shall briefly present Chisholm's theory.
In the four following sections I shall consider various
published criticisms of Chisholm's theory. I shall suggest
that although they require modification of some of Chisholm's
claims, they are not damaging. In the final three sections
I shall present what I think are original criticisms of
Chisholm's position. Some of them are perhaps minor.
Others of them show, I believe, that Chisholm's theory
<
115
stands in need of major revision.
1. States of Affairs
,
Occurrence
,
and Recurrence
.
Chisholm says that a state of affairs is "anything capable
of serving as the object of belief, or of hope, of wonder-
ment, or of any of those other intentional attitudes that
take things other than attributes or individuals as their
2
objects." Thus, a state of affairs is anything which can
be the object of a propositional attitude. Furthermore,
states of affairs can be individuated by appeal to proposi-
tional attitudes. For any states of affairs p and q, p = q
if and only if it is necessary that for any person S and
propositional attitude A, S has A to £ if and only if S has
*
3A to q.
All states of affairs exist , but only some of them occur .
For example, there being unicorns exists, and there being
unicycles exists, for they both can be the object of a
propositional attitude. Only the second, however, occurs.
Of special importance for Chisholm's theory is the fact
that states of affairs can recur, that is, they can occur
more than once. Thus, there being a Republican President
occurred for eight years during the 1950's, and it is oc-
curring again now. In the interval between these two oc
currences of this state of affairs there occurred its
negation, that is, there not being a Republican President.
According to Chisholm, every state of affairs has a negation,
and whenever a state of affairs p is not occurring, j
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negation, not-£, is. The notion of the negation of a state
of affairs can be used to elucidate the concept of recurrence.
Chisholm says, "an event recurs if and only if the event
occurs and then after that the negation of the event occurs
4
and then after that the event occurs."
For any two states of affairs £ and 2./ there is the
conjunctive state of affairs, £ & 2.* The state of affairs
£ & q. occurs if and only if £ occurs while 2 occurs.
Chisholm contrasts the occurrence of states of affairs
and their negations and conjunctions with the truth of
. 5 .
propositions and their negations and conjunctions. First,
some truth involving negation.
(1) £ is true or the negation of £ is true,
(2) p is true if and only if the negation of the
negation, of £ is true
(3) If the negation of £ is true, then £ is not true.
Of these, the first two, but not the third, remain true if
we replace the words 'is true' by 'occurs'. The third be-
comes false because it is possible that a state of affairs
and its negation both occur. For example, suppose that
there not being rain occurs at noon. It would be a mistake
to conclude that there being rain does not occur, for it
might occur at two o'clock.^ The following are truths about
conjunctive propositions:
(4) If p & 2 i s true, then £ is true and 2 ts true,
(5) £ & q is true if and only if & £ is true
3
,
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(6) £ & (SL & £.) true if and only if q & (p & r)is true,
(7) If p is true and £ & q is not true, then p & qis true. 3-
(8) If £ is true and q is true, then £ & q is true,
(9) If £ & q is true, and q & r is true, then p & ris true, " ~
(10)
If P & q is true, then £ & is not true.
Of these, the first four, but not the last three, remain true
if we replace the words 'is true' by 'occurs'. The last
three turn out false because a conjunctive event occurs only
f
if its conjuncts overlap in time. Chisholm gives the follow-
ing counter-examples to ( 8)
—
( 10 )
.
Lincoln being President
has occurred and Agnew being Vice President has occurred,
but Lincoln being President and Agnew being Vice President
has not occurred. Franklin Roosevelt being President and
Truman being Senator has occurred and Roosevelt being
President and Truman being Vice President has occurred, but
Truman being Senator and Truman being Vice President has not
occurred. Finally, Roosevelt being President and Truman
being Vice President has occurred and so has Roosevelt being
7President and Truman not being Vice President.
2. £ Occurs Before Begins . Chisholm introduces the
locution 1 £ occurs before q begins 1 , which he abbreviates
'pBq', and gives the following axioms governing its inter-
pretation. ®
Al £B<^ O ~qBq
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A2 £ occurs and a occurs = (EBa or gBE or E f, a occurs)
A3 [pBq and qBr and MqBp)]o pBr
A4 pBp D £B ~ £
A5 —
'(p ) (pB~ p)
The relation expressed by '£Bq 9 is not asymmetrical. Suppose
that pBq and that p recurs. Then it might be that aBp. So
it does not follow from pBq that ~(pBq ) . The relation ex-
pressed by ’ pBq ' is not transitive, either. Suppose that q
occurs, then r, which occurs only once, then not-q, then p,
which occurs only once, and then r again. In this case,
pBq is true, since £ occurs before the second occurrence of
q, gBr is true, since the first occurrence of c[ occurs be-
fore r begins, but pBr is false. Also, it follows from A2
that pBq entails that p occurs and q occurs.
In terms of his primitive locution, Chisholm goes on
to give the following definitions :
^
(Dl) £ recurs (or £ occurs at least twice) =df £Bp,
(u2) £ always occurs = (jf not-£ does not occur,
(D3) £ occurs exactly once =df £ occurs and ~(£Bp)
,
(B4) occurs during £'s first occurrence there is
a q such that <£ occurs exactly once, & s_ occurs,
q_ & £ does not occur, and ~(£BgJ ,
(D5) There is something that occurs during what is at
least £“ s nr occurrence there is an £ such
that s_ occurs exactly once, and there is a j and
an r such that: £ occurs exactly once, c[ occurs
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during g' s occurrence n- 1
,
gBr, rBs, p & s
occurs
,
and p & r does not occur.
(D6) g occurs exactly n times =df there is something
that occurs during what is at least g' s nth oc-
currence and nothing that occurs during what is
at least g' s occurrence n+1.
These definitions define expressions purporting to denote
particular occurrences of a state of affairs g without using
any term that refers to particular occurrences of a state
of affairs. Thus, by means of these definitions,, Chisholm
hopes to show how we can reduce talk of particular occurrences
of states of affairs to talk just about states of affairs.
Since, as we shall see in the next section, Chisholm regards
events as a certain subclass of states of affairs, he thinks
that these definitions provide a method of eliminating talk
of particular or concrete events in favor of his "generic"
events
.
3. Events, Propositions , and Truth . Propositions, in
the sense of those entities "such that the laws of proposi-
tional logic may be interpreted as being applicable to them,"
may be defined according to Chisholm by the following
definition
(D7) p is a proposition =df g is a state of affairs &
it is necessary that either g or not-g does not
occur.
It follows, according to (D2)
,
Chisholm notes, that a
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proposition is any state of affairs which is necessarily such
that either it or its negation always occurs. 10
And an event may be defined according to the following
definition
:
(D8) £ is an event =df (i) £ is a contingent state of
affairs
, (n) £ i s not a proposition, and (iii) p
implies change.
A state of affairs implies change, according to Chisholm, if
and only if it implies that there is some state of affairs p
such that £ occurs and not—p occurs.
Some states of affairs, then, are propositions, some
are events, and some are neither.
xhus that state of affairs which is John walking at
3 P.M., E.S.T., on February 5, 1970, will be a
proposition
,
for it is necessarily such that either
it or its negation does not occur. But that state
of affairs which is John walking will be an event;
for it is contingent, it is possibly such that both
it and its negation occur, and it implies change.
And that state of affairs which is John sitting will
be neither a proposition nor an event. 11
Finally, Chisholm proposes a theory of truth in terms
of the occurrence of states of affairs. A proposition £ is
true if and only if £ occurs, and £ is false if and only if
£ does not occur. Moreover, if facts are states of affairs
that occur, then true propositions bear the relation of
identity to the facts they "correspond to".
4. Existence and Occurrence . A possible objection to
Chisholm's view might be thought to lurk in the following
i 12passage frQm a paper by Gertrude Ezorsky.
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Professor Chisholm does not argue that any alterna-
tive to this view is necessarily false, only that the
metaphysical view [that there are states of affairs]
ran clarify some issues in the analysis of language.
Since the metaphysical view is not necessarily true,
then its denial, "There are no states of affairs,"
must be significant. But according to the meta-
physical view, [there] is a state of affairs corres-
ponding to every significant sentence. In that case,
there must be a state of affairs corresponding to the
significant sentence, "There are no states of affairs,"
namely, the state of affairs, such that there are no
states of affairs. But surely that state of affairs
is paradoxical . 13
\
There are, of course, several lacunae in the above argument.
It does not follow from the fact that Chisholm did not argue
that alternatives to his view are necessarily false, that
his view is not necessarily true. Nor need it be shown that
a sentence is not necessarily false in order to show that it
is significant, in the sense that it is meaningful. But,
more to the point, what is paradoxical about the state of
affairs, there being no states of affairs? Well, suppose
that it occurs. Then it follows both that there are no
states of affairs and that there are states of affairs (since
it is one). This proves, of course, that it does not occur.
But this is harmless enough, for Chisholm is not committed
to the occurrence of every state of affairs, only the ex-
istence. And no contradiction follows from supposing that
the above state of affairs exists.
5. The Problem of Adverbial Modification
.
An objection,
made repeatedly, by Davidson goes as follows:
I
An adequate theory [of events] must give an account
of adverbial modification; for example, the condi-
tions under which [11] 'Sebastian strolled through
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the streets of Bologna at 2 A.M. ' is
must make clear why it entails [12]
through the streets of Bologna.' 14
said to be true
Sebastian strolled
Davidson's own theory treats (11) and (12) as
(11 ) (Ex) (Strolled (Sebastian
,
x) & Through (the streets of
Bologna
,
x) & At (2 A. M. , x) )
,
and
(12 ) (Ex) (Strolled (Sebastian
,
x) & Through (the streets of
Bologna
,
x)
)
The desired inference, on this account, goes through as a
matter of logical form. But how can Chisholm explain this
inference? If he renders (11) and (12) as
(11*
') (Ex) (
x
is the strolling of Sebastian through the
streets of Bologna at 2 A.M. & x occurred)
,
and
(12'
') (Ex) (x is the strolling of Sebastian through the
streets of Bologna & x occurred)
then it is not obvious why the inference holds.
We might note that if the claims made in Chapter III are
correct, then Davidson's account of the logical form of action
sentences is defective, and thus he has not given a satisfactory
explanation of the above inference, either. Moreover, there
is a reason, it seems to me, to think that particular events
are not needed to account for the entailment of (12) by (11) .
For consider
(13) The White House is white on Thursday, and
(14) The White House is white.
Clearly, (^.3) entails (14), but if we are to account for this
inference in an analogous fashion, we must suppose that there
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is a state of being white in which the White House is and
in which it is on Thursday. That is perhaps not so far-
fetched, but the extra entity required is not an event.
The difficulty is that as we multiply examples we seem to
have to multiply entities which by quantifying over we ac-
count for certain inferences. Thus Romane Clark 16 suggests
that
(15) Jones was staggering drunk, from wine, in his room,
at 10 : 0 0 A.M.
entails
(16) Jones was drunk at 10:00 A.M.
,
and that
(17) Smith is an alumni trustee, of Duke, in Durham, for
an unexpired term of two years, starting in '66
entails
(18) Smith is a trustee of Duke.
To account for the former inference in Davidson-like fashion,
we need to quantify over a state; to do the same for the
latter, we need to quantify over an office. There is no
reason why we cannot introduce an appropriate entity to
quantify over in each case, but a more general treatment of
the type of inference in question would certainly be more
elegant
.
Such a more general treatment is suggested by Terence
17 18Parsons and Romane Clark . On their approach a predicate
modifier like 'from wine* is an operator which maps the
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property expressed by 'is drunk' onto a new property (ex-
pressed by 'is drunk from wine'). Clark suggests that for
standard modifiers (like 'in Bologna', 'at 2 A.M.', 'from
wine', but excluding what Chisholm19 calls "pseudo-adverbial
expressions" like 'apparently', 'in the imagination', and
nearly ) a principle of predicate detachment holds, and it
is this principle which licenses the above inferences.
Surely this theory needs to be worked out in greater detail.
But we have seen enough, I think, to see that the proper
response to Davidson's objection is to deny that an adequate
theory of events need account for inferences like the one
from (11) to (12).
6. Two Schemata . In order to account for the mutual en-
tailraent of
(19) There occurs that event which is the strolling of
Sebastian in Bologna at 2 A.M.
,
and
(20) Sebastian strolls in Bologna at 2 A.M.
Chisholm introduces the following two schemata, where 'p' may
be replaced by any well-formed sentence and 'not-p' by its
negation
:
(A) (Ex) [ (x consists in the fact that pj & (x occurs) ]=p,
(B) (Ex) [ (x consists in the fact that p) & (x occurs) ]=
not-p .
^
These principles, Chisholm says, "could be said to reflect, in
part, our commitment to states of affairs." Given that state-
ment (19) is an "informal rendering" of
I
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(21)
(Ex) (x consists in the fact that Sebastianm Bologna at 2 A.M. and x occurs)
,
n I. rol ls
principle (A) accounts for the fact that (19) and (20) en
tail each other.
inciples (A) and (B) are puzzling, however. As we saw
in Section 3, Chisholm defines a fact as a state of affairs
which occurs. Thus, for any state of affairs p, 'the fact
that £ is a proper description just in case p occurs. Since
if £ does not occur, not-£ occurs, it follows from (B) that
if £ does not occur there is something which consists in the
fact that £ and which does not occur. ;But what can that be,
especially if there is no such thing as the fact that £?
Perhaps Chisholm means to be using 'the fact that p' in this
context as a synonym for 'the state of affairs that p'. But
again suppose that £ does not occur. What is it that (B) says
exists, consists in the state of affairs that £, and does not
occur? The simplest answer would be £, itself, although I do
not know if this is what Chisholm intends.
Chisholm gets more use out of his locution 'consists in
£' in replying to an objection of Davidson's. Davidson had
noted that if Sebastian strolled in the streets of Innsbruck,
then he took a stroll that was not in the streets of
21Bologna. Davidson then asked how Chisholm would analyse
(22) Sebastian took a stroll that was not in the streets
of Bologna,
noting that
(23) (Ex) (x is the strolling of Sebastian & x was not
in the streets of Bologna & x occurred)
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would not suffice. For if (23) is an adequate rendering of
(22)
,
then
(24) (Ex) (x is the strolling of Sebastian & x was in
the streets of Bologna & x occurred)
should translate
(25) Sebastian took a stroll in the streets of Bologna.
But, given that there is only one state of affairs that is
the strolling of Sebastian, (23) and (24) contradict each
other, although the unanalyzed (22) and (25) do not.
In response to this objection, Chisholm admits that
(23) is not an adequate rendering of (22)
,
and suggests in-
stead
(26) (Ex) (x consists in the fact that Sebastian strolled
& x occurred in a place wholly other than Bologna). 22
Now (26) is informative only if we understand what it is
to consist in a fact. Are there many things that consist in
the fact that Sebastian strolled? Or is there just one?
The following is a slight reason for believing that Chisholm
thinks that there is just one. He was careful to put the
clause that Sebastian's strolling did not occur in Bologna in
a positive way, that is, as in (26) and not as in
(26') (Ex) (x consists in the fact that Sebastian strolled
& x dFd not occur in the streets of Bologna)
.
This suggests that Chisholm wanted to allow for the pos-
sibility that (25) is also true and analyzed as
(27) (Ex) (x consists in the fact that Sebastian strolled
& x occurred in Bologna)
,
without contradiction. But, of course, (26') and (2
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contradict each other only if there is just one thiny that
consists in the fact that Sebastian strolled. A better
reason is provided by Chisholm's claim, noted above, that
(19) There occurs that event which is the strolling
of Sebastian in Bologna at 2 A.M.
is an "informal rendering" of
(21) (Ex) (x consists in the fact that Sebastian strollsin Bologna at 2 A.M. and x occurs)
.
certainly (19) implies the uniqueness of the event in question.
If it is that event which is what consists in the fact that
Sebastian strolls in Bologna at 2 A.M. and occurs, then (21)
,
and also (26) should be taken as asserting uniqueness.
Davidson replies to Chisholm's acceptance of (26) as
the translation of (22) as follows:
This solution leaves us with two problems. First, we
do not know what the following well-formed sentence
means: 'There is an x such that x is the strolling
of Sebastian and x is not in the streets of Bologna'
(since Chisholm agrees that this doesn't mean that
Sebastian took a stroll that was not in Bologna)
.
And second, the solution works only on an ad hoc
basis, by finding some positive characteristic to
replace a negative. 23
Davidson's first problem can be easily answered, I think.
The sentence in question means that Sebastian never strolled
in Bologna. The second problem might be more serious. I
think that ,it might be related to the following difficulty.
Suppose
(28) Sebastian took a stroll that was pleasant.
Does (28) go over into
(29) (Ex) (x consists in the fact that Sebastian strolled
& x occurred and x was pleasant)
?
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If it does, then
(30) Sebastian took a stroll that was unpleasant
presumably gets treated as
(31) (Ex) (x consists in the fact that Sebastian strolled
& x occurred & x was unpleasant)
.
On the assumption that there is just one thing that consists
in the fact that Sebastian strolled, (29) and (31) are con-
tradictory, although (28) and (30) can both be true if
Sebastian took at least two strolls. Can (30) be analyzed
in a way that avoids this difficulty?
A feature common to both (22) and (25)
,
and (28) and
1 . .
(30) is that there are truths about some occurrences of an
event that are not truths about other occurrences of that
event. Since Chisholm does not want to speak of particular
occurrences of an event, he must engage in some circumlocution
to accommodate such cases as we have been considering. Thus,
suppose that Sebastian strolled just twice and that his first
stroll was pleasant and his second unpleasant. Since (28)
reports Sebastian's first stroll, perhaps Chisholm could
treat it as
(32) ($x) (x consists in the fact that Sebastian strolled
& x occurred & (E^) (y_ consists in the fact that
Sebastian's stroll was pleasant & y_ occurs during
x ' s first occurrence)).
(Recall that ' s_ occurs during jd's first occurrence' is de-
fined by D4
,
above.) Better yet, (32) could be simplified
and the expression 'consisting in the fact' dropped:
(33) Sebastian's stroll being pleasant occurs during
Sebastian's strolling's first occurrence.
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Perhaps, in a similar manner, other claims about particular
occurrences of an event can be stated.
We are still left with (A) and (B)
,
and there is a
further difficulty with them. Consider some state of af-
fairs that recurs, say, there being rain. If this state of
affairs recurs, then there being rain occurs and there not
being rain occurs. Thus,
(34) (Ex) (x consists in the fact that it is raining &
x occurs)
,
and
(35) (Ex) (x consists in the fact that it is not raining
& x occurs)
.
By principle (A) and (34) we can infer
(36) It is raining.
By principle (A) and (35) we can infer
(37) It is not raining.
Now (36) and (37) need not be contradictory; since the fair
weather and foul weather they report either occurred at dif-
ferent times or at different places, they do not affirm and
deny the same proposition. However, (37) and principle (B)
yield
(38) (Ex) (x consists in the fact that it is raining &
x does not occur)
.
But the conjunction of (34) and (38) is inconsistent with
*
there being just one thing that consists in the fact that p.
I suggested above that the expression ' (Ex) (x consists in
the fact that jd) ' would be intelligible if for each sentence
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£ there was just one entity consisting in the fact that
namely, the state of affairs that £. if this suggestion
is adopted, then (A) and (B) are incompatible with there
being any recurrent events. Since there being recurrent
events is an important feature of Chisholm's theory. (A)
and (B) are inconsistent with Chisholm's theory.
On the other hand, there might be more than one thing
which consists in the fact that it is raining. If so, (34)
and (38) are not inconsistent. However, if this option is
taken, if in general for any sentence 'g_' there can be more
than one entity which consists in the fact that p, then I
have no idea what it is for something to consist in the fact
that p. I think that Chisholm would be better off without
(A) and (B) . That would leave the mutual entailment of
(19) There occurs that event which is the strolling
of Sebastian in Bologna at 2 A.M.
,
and
(20) Sebastian strolls in Bologna at 2 A.M.
25
unaccounted for, but since (19) is in the technical
language of Chisholm's theory, he can simply tell us what
it means, that it is, in fact, a fancy way of expressing (20).
7. Another Objection . Chisholm considers a number of
objections to his theory, among them, the following:
"Your view requires us to say that that state of
affairs which is Nixon's being in Washington is not
the same state of affairs which is Johnson's suc-
cessor being in Washington. But that event which
is Nixon's being in Washington is the same event
which is Johnson's successor being in Washington.
Therefore your view is not adequate to the con-
cept of an event. "26
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Chisholm replies to this objection as follows:
But is_ Nixon's being in Washington the same event asJohnson s successor being in Washington. Or. moreprecisely, if n is there being one and only one manwho is identical with Nixon and is in Washington,
and if J is there being one and only one man who isidentical with Johnson's successor and is in Washinq-ton, is N identical with J? Surely not, for we can
say of N, but not of J, that had Humphrey won, it
would not have occurred. 27
We might note that if John's sitting is not an event (be-
cause it does not imply change), then Nixon's being in
Washington is not an event either. Rather, it should be a
state of affairs that is neither an event or a proposition.
I shall claim below that this distinction has not been clear-
ly drawn, and so we may safely ignore this point. Aside from
this minor flaw, then, what Chisholm says seems to be right.
Davidson, however, does not agree. He says,
If this were a good argument, we could unhinge other
true identity-statements: compare 'We can say of
Nixon, but not of Johnson's successor, that had
Humphrey won, he would not have been president.
Therefore Nixon is not Johnson's successor. 28
Davidson seems to be suggesting that Chisholm's argument is
invalid
,
that there are instances of it with true premisses
and a false conclusion. If this is Davidson's claim, he has
not put it convincingly, for, as Chisholm notes, the premisses
Davidson offers are not both true. Davidson's argument may
be written like this
:
(39) Nixon is such that he would not have been president
had Humphrey won.
(40) Johnson's successor is such that he would have been
president had Humphrey won.
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(41) Nixon ^ Johnson's successor.
This is indeed an argument with a false conclusion, and it
does have the same form as Chisholm's argument. But it does
not show Chisholm's argument to be invalid, since the second
premiss is false. We might put Chisholm's argument like this
(42) N is such that it would not have occurred had
Humphrey won.
(43) J is such that it would have occurred had Humphrey
won.
/. (44) N f J.
We may assume that we are given (42). Is (43) also true?
If the expression 'J' abbreviates denotes a state of affairs,
then presumably it is. If, however, the expression 'J' ab-
breviates denotes a particular event of the sort favored by
Davidson, then perhaps it is not. 30 At any rate, it is not
clear that Chisholm has committed a fallacy. And while his
argument may not be sufficient to convince someone who does
not accept states of affairs, it is at least a consistent
reply to the objection against which it was intended. And
so that objection, anyway, is not damaging.
8. Chisholm' s Definition of ' Event
'
. I turn now to what
I think are more important difficulties with Chisholm's
theory of events. The first has to do with certain puzzles
about his definition of 'event*. Recall that the definition
is
(D8) £ is an event (i) £ is a contingent state of
affairs, (ii) £ is not a proposition, and (iii) £
implies change.
133
I wonder first whether anything is added to the definition by
requiring that events be contingent. Suppose that '£' is
restricted to states of affairs. Does clause (i) add any-
thing not contained in clause ( ii ) ? I suspect that it does
not. Suppose that some state of affairs £ is not contingent.
Then either it is necessary that £ always occurs or it is
necessary that £ never occurs. Consider the first case. If
it is necessary that £ always occurs, then by (D2) , it is
necessary that not-£ does not occur. But if it is necessary
that not-£ does not occur, then £ is such that necessarily
either it or its negation does not occur. But that is just
to say, in virtue of (D7)
,
that £ is a proposition. Consider
the second case, that it is necessary that p never occurs.
Then £ is such that necessarily either it or its negation
does not occur. But again, by (D7)
,
it follows that p is a
proposition. Thus, if a state of affairs £ is not contingent,
then it is a proposition. Conversely, if £ is not a proposi-
tion, then it is contingent. So clause (ii) or (D8) entails
clause (i) . I have two reservations about this argument.
First, (D2) was used, and it might not be adequate. Second,
I have had to supply a definition of a state of affairs being
contingent
,
and Chisholm may have intended some other
definition. We are surely justified in asking, however,
what Chisholm intends to add to (D8) by including clause (i)
.
Secondly, I wonder whether clause (iii) adds anything
to the definition of 'event', or more exactly, I wonder what
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clause (iii) amount to. Chisholm says that a state of affairs
p implies change just in case |d implies that there is some
state of affairs such that
^ occurs and not-<q occurs. But
what is this relation of implication holding between states
of affairs? Well, one possibility is that it is the relation
of material implication, about which there are many truths of
logic. But as we have seen, Chisholm interprets the laws of
logic as being about propositions, and not events. Thus,
material implication has not been defined for events, or for
states of affairs generally. We might try
(D9) p (materially) implies c[ If |d occurs then <£ occurs,
where p and c[ are states of affairs and the conditional on the
right-hand side is understood as a material conditional. But
given that there are events that recur, for example, there
being rain, it follows trivially that every state of affairs
p is such that if jd occurs then there is a ^ such that oc-
curs and not-c^ occurs. So if (D9) is taken as defining the
sense of implication Chisholm has in mind, no state of af-
fairs fails to imply change. But Chisholm insists that states
31
of affairs like John's sitting or Jones' automobile being
32 .in his garage are neither events nor propositions. So
perhaps the following definition is more appropriate:
(DIO) p implies c[ =df It is necessary that if
jd occurs
then c[ occurs
,
where £ and are states of affairs. According to (DIO)
John's sitting implies change only if in every possible world
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in which John's sitting occurs there is some state of affairs
a such that a occurs and not-a occurs. is it true that in
every possible world in which John's sitting occurs there
is a a such that a occurs and not-a occurs? I suspect that
it is, although I am not sure how to answer the question.
One somehow feels that John could not exist if he did not at
least do a little thinking, and if he did, there would be
some state of affairs such that both it and its negation occur
Regardless of how we answer the question, I think it is clear
that Chisholm is committed to an affirmative answer. Consider
the following passage:
I shall make three metaphysical assumptions: (1)that no event is followed by its negation unless
some individual thing alters or comes into being
or ceases to be; (2) that every individual thing
is such that, for any two moments of its existence,
it has some properties at the one moment it does
not have at the other; and (3) that nothing is
capable of "two beginnings of existence" i.e., if
a thing ceases to be then it itself does not come
into being again. These assumptions guarantee that,
as long as there are individual things , . . . for any
interval of time something is occurring throughout
that interval that does not occur at any other
interval. 33
I think that by calling these assumptions "metaphysical",
Chisholm means to suggest that they are necessarily true.
Moreover, he adds in a footnote that "given a proper con-
ception of time, the statement expressing the second of
these assumptions can be shown to be analytic. Thus, I
think that Chisholm is committed to holding that in every
possible world every individual thing is such that, for any
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two moments of its existence, it has some properties at the
one moment it does not have at the other
.
35
So consider
those worlds in which John's sitting occurs and pick any
two moments at which John exists in any such world. At
the one moment John has a property which he lacks at the
other. Pick any such property and call if 'F'
. Then John's
being F occurs at the one moment and John's not being F
occurs at the other. Thus, in any world in which John's
sitting occurs, there is some state of affairs g such that
both g and not-j occur. But then, by (DIO)
,
John's sitting
implies change. So John's sitting is an event, after all.
This argument shows that any state of affairs which implies
(in the sense of (DIO)) that there is some individual thing,
implies (in the sense of (DIO) ) that there is change. And
so any such state of affairs will be an event, if it is not
a proposition.
Are there any states of affairs that are neither events
nor propositions? On the assumption that (DIO) gives the
sense of 'implies' which Chisholm intended, I have not been
able to think of any state of affairs which is neither an
event nor a proposition. Of course, it does not follow that
there are none. On the other hand, maybe Chisholm would re-
ject (DIO ) .
A final suggestion comes from Chisholm, himself. In a
footnote he says that "we may define a sense of entailment
that is stronger than logical implication: 'jd entails g
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provided only it is necessary that (i) E implies a and (ii)
anyone who accepts E also accepts a . -»
36
Let us call the
relation Chisholm here defines 'C-implication'. Then we can
state the following definition:
(Dll) £ implies £ C-implies
Is (Dll) of any help in making sense of (D8)? I think not.
According to (D8)
,
if a state of affairs, say, John's walk-
ing, is an event, then John's walking implies that there is
some state of affairs q such that q occurs and not-q occurs.
And according to (Dll), this latter holds only if it is
necessary that anyone who accepts John's walking accepts
there being some q^ such that q^ occurs and not-q occurs. But,
of course, this is not necessary. Suppose that someone who
does not think that states of affairs have negations accept
John's walking. Then that person, if consistent, will not
also accept there being some state of affairs q such that q
occurs and not-q occurs. But then if (Dll) is right, John's
walking does not imply change, and so it is not an event.
Chisholm, of course, would think that John's walking is an
event, so (Dll) must not capture his intention in clause
(iii) of (D8) . The difficulty with (D9) and (DIO) was that
they allowed more states of affairs to be events than
Chisholm wants. The difficulty with (Dll) is that it does
not allow as many as Chisholm wants.
We might wonder why Chisholm would want to make the
distinction between events and states of affairs which are
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neither events nor propositions. If there is no compelling
need to make the distinction, then it is no loss if it has
not been made clearly. Since Chisholm has not told us why
he wants to make the distinction, we can only speculate as
to how serious the objection that I have been making is.
9. Counting. Chisholm's theory, like any fine-grained
theory of events, immediately faces some difficulties due
simply to the plethora of entities it posits. One such
difficulty is to make sense of our ordinary concept of an
event in terms of the myriad of events presupposed by the
theory. For example, suppose that Sir Walter Scott was
knighted at night with honor. We might ordinarily say, in
this case, that one knighting occurred. But on Chisholm's
theory, when Scott was knighted, at least the following
events occurred: Sir Walter Scott's being knighted; Sir
Walter Scott's being knighted at night; Sir Walter Scott's
being knighted with honor; Sir Walter Scott's being knighted
at night with honor; the author of Waverley ' s being knighted:
etc. Clearly these are all distinct, on Chisholm's view,
since for any pair of these states of affairs someone could
believe one and not believe the other, or expect the one
and not expect the other, or hope for the one and not hope
for the other, and so on for the other attitudes.
It is instructive to see that two maneuvers open to Kim
are not available to Chisholm. Consider first the two
events, Scott's being knighted and Scott's being knighted at
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night. Assuming they both occurred 37 and that no one else
was knighted then, just one knighting occurred. According
to Kim the first of these is Scott's having the property of
being
_
knighted (at a time t)
,
and the second is Scott's
having the property of being knighted at night (at t)
. Kim
can go on to say that since only the constitutive property
of the former is being knighted
, only the former is a
knighting; to count knightings you count instances of the
O O
property being knighted. This move is not open to Chisholm,
however, since his theory has no room for constitutive
properties
.
Or consider Scott's being knighted and the author of
Waverley ' s being knighted. According to Kim, these two
descriptions each describe the same individual having the
same property and so, assuming they occurred at the same
time, describe just one event. On the other hand, Chisholm
is committed to holding that Scott's being knighted is dis-
tinct from the author of Waverley 1 s being knighted, since
someone ignorant of the identity of Scott and the author of
Waverley could believe the one and not believe the other.
The events of our intuitions are, if not coarse-grained,
at least medium-grained, and Chisholm has not shown how they
might be reconstructed out of his fine-grained ones. Nor is
there any obvious way of doing so. But until this is done,
Chisholm's theory would seem to be unable to make clear sense
of our preanalytic intuitions about events.
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10. Same^ Time, Different Place
. Chisholm's theory is
designed to accommodate states of affairs which occur at some
time and whose negations occur at other times. But his
theory also allows the possibility that an event might occur
m a certain place while its negation occurs in another
place at the same time. But this possibility makes trouble
for some of Chisholm's definitions. Consider first Chisholm'
definition of recurrence:
(Dl) p recurs (or £ occurs at least twice) == dBpdf — C-
Informally
, Chisholm explains recurrence as "if an event p
recurs
, that is, if p occurs at least twice, then £ occurs,
p is followed by its negation, and £ follows its negation." 39
But this formal definition does not require that an event
occur followed by its negation and then occur again. It
merely requires that for an event to recur, some occurrence
of it must occur before another occurrence. Suppose that it
only rains twice, and that both occurrences of there being
rain occur on the same day. Suppose, furthermore, that on
that day it rains in Chicago from 8:00 A.M. to 9:00 A.M.
,
and it rains in Grand Rapids from 8:30 A.M. to 9:30 A.M.
It seems clear that there being rain has occurred twice.
It also seems to be the case that there being rain has oc-
curred before there being rain begins. But it is not the
case that there being rain occurs, followed by there not
being rain, followed by there being rain. So Chisholm's
formal definition of recurrence does not capture his informal
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explanation.
A reply to this objection might be as follows: Axiom
(A4) pBjDogB
— £
requires, it might be claimed, that ' EbE ' should be under-
stood as saying that an occurrence of E finishes occurring
before an occurrence of p begins to occur, rather than as
saying that an occurrence of E begins before another oc-
currence of E begins. Again suppose that it only rains
twice, but this time suppose that it begins to rain at 8:00
A.M. in Chicago and continues forever, and it begins to rain
at 8:30 A.M. in Grand Rapids and continues forever. In this
case it is inconsistent with (A4) to assert that there being
rain occurs before there being rain, for there is no oc-
currence of there not being rain which begins after either
of the occurrences of there being rain.
In the case as originally described, that is, when it
rained only from 8:00 A.M. to 9:00 A.M. in Chicago and from
8.30 A.M. to 9:30 A.M. in Grand Rapids, there is an oc-
currence of there not being rain which begins after an oc-
currence of there being rain. So this case does not
violate (A4)
. What I think that this points out, however,
is that Chisholm's axioms (A1)-(A5) do not specify a unique
relation. On the one hand they seem to be consistent with
ke in9 interpreted as 'there is an occurrence of p
which finishes before some occurrence of c[ begins' . On the
other hand, they seem to be consistent with ' EBc[' being
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interpreted
before some
as 'there is an occurrence of p that begins
occurrence of a begins, unless p-g. and there
is no occurrence of not-p beginning after an occurrence
of p, in which case there is an occurrence of p that
finishes before an occurrence of g begins'.
The original objection could have been stated in a
way which avoids the controversy over the interpretation
of pBq
. Again suppose that it never rains except that
theie is a time
, such that it begins to rain at in
Chicago, and there is a later time t
2
such that it rains
m Chicago at every time after up to, but not including,
-2* Also, it begins to rain in Grand Rapids at t . Clearly
it is the case that there is an occurrence of there being
ram which finishes occurring before another occurrence of
there being rain begins, thus satisfying the definiens of
(Dl)
. But again, it is not the case that the event of
there being rain is such that "the event occurs and then
after that the negation of the event occurs and then after
that the event occurs." ^ So Chisholm's informal explanation
of recurrence does not match his formal definition.
A way of avoiding this difficulty would be to revise
(Dl) as follows:
(Dl') p recurs in L = _ (p's occurring in L)B(p's
occurring in L)
,
where 'L' is to be replaced by the name of a place. This
would leave 'p recurs ( simpliciter ) ' undefined. However,
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part of the point of talking about recurrence is to make
sense of sentences like, 'Something happened last week in
Los Angeles, and the same thing happened this week in New
York 1
,
and (D1‘) is of no help for that.
Another, and perhaps more serious, difficulty due to
the fact that an event may occur at one place while its
negation occurs at another, is with (D4)
.
(D4) s^ occurs during £'s first occurrence = there18 a 3. such that q occurs exactly once, q & soccurs, q &^p does not occur, and ^(pBq).
Suppose that it never rains in Tempe
,
Arizona. So there not
being rain always occurs in Tempe. Suppose also that the
first occurrence of there being rain is in Seattle. It is
likely that there were a number of things which occurred
during the first occurrence of there being rain. Perhaps
the inhabitants were greatly amazed. Certainly the ground's
getting wet occurred then. If so, there must be some state
of affairs q satisfying the conditions set by the definiens
of (D4)
. But one of these conditions is that q & there not
being rain does not occur. But, since there not being rain
always occurs (in Tempe, at least)
,
there is no q such that
2. occurs and q & there not being rain fails to occur. So
nothing occurs during the first occurrence of there being
rain. In particular, there being rain does not occur during
the first occurrence of there being rain. So obviously, (D4)
is defective. Since (D4) is the base case for the induction
in (D5)
,
and since (D6) relies on (D4) and (D5)
,
(D5) and
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(D6) are defective, as well. Thus Chisholm has not defined
’£ occurs exactly n times-, and thus it is not clear that
his generic events can do the work of particular events.
Chisholm could avoid this objection by adopting a sug-
gestion he makes in another context. 41 Conjunctive states
of affairs could be restricted in the following way. Where
P and a are any states of affairs, 42 the conjuctive state
of affairs ft j occurs if and only if E occurs while a oc-
curs, and £ occurs where j occurs. In the case above, if it
rains in Seattle, then any event £ occurring only during the
raining and occurring only in Seattle is such that a & there
not being rain does not occur. The fact that there not being
rain occurs in Tempe is irrelevant, because that is not where
q occurs. And so the above counter-example no longer applies.
The trouble is that the notion of the location of an event
is unclear. While some events, like Socrates' drinking hem-
lock, are easily locatable (where Socrates was), others are
not. Where does there being no unicorns occur? Or where
does my not being at home occur? Here? At my home? I do
not know. There not being rain can occur, presumably,
wherever it is not raining. But where does there not being
rain in Tempe occur? Just in Tempe? Or everywhere? I
would be tempted to think that such "place-indexed" events
occur everywhere if they occur anywhere. But then we must
countenance the following anomaly. If Jones and Smith
never sleep in the same place, then it might be that the
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conjunctive event Jones' sleeping in Chicago and Smith's
sleeping in St. Louis occurs, if they sleep, respectively,
m Chicago and St. Louis. But the conjuctive event Jones'
sleeping and Smith's sleeping will not occur. Another dif-
ficulty is that even if we were able to decide where events
occur, how close together must £ and ^ occur for £ to occur
where q occurs? Since my body occupies a different space
than your body
, does it follow that the event my talking
and your talking never occurs, even if we hold a lengthy
conversation.
These considerations do not show that it would be im-
possible to state Chisholm's theory in a way that is both
clear and immune to objections. But based on the remarks
of the last three sections, I think that we can agree that
that has not yet been done. I think, furthermore, that a
full evaluation of Chisholm's theory cannot be attempted
until we see how successfully it can cope with these
difficulties
.
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CHAPTER VI
Conclusion
In this chapter I shall first review some motivations
for thinking that there are such things as events, and I
shall be interested in determining how compelling each of
these motivations is, and how well the three theories we
have examined accommodate themselves to these motivations.
Secondly, I shall list some difficulties to which any
adequate theory of events ought to provide solutions, and
I shall try to measure how well the theories of Kim,
Davidson, and Chisholm cope with these difficulties.
1* Motivation
. There are a cluster of reasons in
favor of an ontology of events which might be called
"linguistic" reasons, for they all appeal to some feature
of our language. First, we often assert true sentences,
such as
(1) John's kicking the door startled me.
A natural way of understanding this sentence is as assert-
ing that there occurred a certain event - denoted by 'John's
kicking the door' - which startled me. 1 While the three
philosophers we have considered do not make this claim
explicitly, it is clear that they agree with it. Of course
there are other expressions in our language which purport
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to refer to events. Definite descriptions like, 'the first
performance of Beethoven's Ninth '
,
provide a notable ex-
ample. Davidson adds the following caveat, however: "If
the only pressure for adopting an ontology of events comes
from such phrases as 'Sally's third birthday party', we
would probably do better to try and [sic] paraphrase these
away in context than meddle with the logical form of sen-
tences like 'Brutus killed Caesar' or 'Bread nourishes' so
as to show singular terms referring to events or variables
2ranging over them. " Davidson offers other linguistic
reasons for the existence of events. One, as we have
already seen, is that he thinks that there must be events
to account for the inference of
(2) Boris strolled
from
(3) Boris strolled in Bologna.
I argued in Chapter III that Davidson's treatment of the
logical form of action sentences - which does provide on
account of the entail ment of (2) by (3) - is defective,
because it cannot handle cases in which two things are
done at once. I also suggested in Section 5 of Chapter
IV that a more general account of adverbial modification
would be more promising. Because of these considerations
I do not think that this is a good reason for accepting
events
.
There is a further linguistic reason, also due to
Davidson, that is worth mentioning. Davidson considers
some parallels between
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(4) The explorer was in the cellar
and
(5) The explosion was in the cellar,
and then remarks
With respect to relevant grammatical and logical
matters, the parallel between talk of explorers
and talk of explosions is just about complete. As
we have seen, explorers and explosions alike invite
the definite and indefinite article; they alsoinvite plural forms, universal quantification,
counting and identity statements. There is no
more reason to think that we can give a satisfactory
account of the truth conditions of sentences about
explosions without invoking particular, dated events,
than there is to think that we can give a satisfactory
account of the truth conditions of sentences about
explorers without invoking particular, mortal bodies.
We might note that this consideration is not a compelling
reason to accept events. Nouns like 'gap* and 'hole' meet
the conditions Davidson lists, yet we would not want to
suppose that we must be committed to particular gaps and
particular holes in order to give an account of the truth
conditions of sentences like, 'There was a gap between her
front teeth'. Nevertheless, Davidson's remarks indicate
at least a prima facie reason for thinking that there are
events. Coupled with other considerations it may well
be persuasive.
Another kind of reason which various philosophers
have given in favor of events is that they are needed for
the theory of explanation. Kim says that he is ''interested
4in events qua objects of explanation." As we noted in
Sections 1 and 2 of Chapter IV, Davidson also holds that
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"explanation... seems to call for events." 5 And, although
I do not know whether Chisholm has said so in print, he
also believes that events are needed for explanation. 6
There is an interesting conflict, however, between what
Kim and Davidson have said about needing events for
explanation and what they have said about events. 7
In "Events and their Descriptions: Some Considerations"
Kim considers various ways of defining a deductive ex-
planans for a statement E, and he is concerned to make
precise the way event-describing statements are related to
events
. By combining these two enterprises he hopes to
make intelligible the notion of an explanans for an event.
In this connection he accepts "the unexceptionable principle
that if event e is identical with event e
' ,
any explanans
for e is an explanans for e'..." 8 However, when Kim gets
around to spelling out some details of his theory of
9
events, he says some things incompatible with this
principle. As we saw in Section 2 of Chapter I, according
to Kim's theory there is just one event described by
(6) Wilbur married Edith
and
(7) Edith married Wilbur,
yet Kim thinks that what explains (6) might not explain (7)
.
10
Kim is aware of the conflict between what he said in one
paper about explanation and what he said in another paper
about identity conditions for events. He now holds both
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that (6) and (7) describe the same event and that what
explains (6) might not explain (7). He also says that
[ t ] his means that I have to loosen up the fairly tight
connection I presuppose between events and explanations
m the Hempel volume paper." 11 This last concession is
interesting because it means that the relation between
explanation and events is left unexplained. If explana-
tion is only of statements
,
then there is no need to posit
events to account for explanation. If, on the other hand,
someone says that events are needed for explanation, but
does not show how they are connected, then it is difficult
to assess the claim.
Davidson seems to be in even worse trouble in this
connection. For he says that events are needed to give an
account of explanation, but then also says that "[ex-
planations typically relate statements, not events." 12
Elsewhere he says that "explanation, like giving reasons,
is geared to sentences or propositions rather than directly
to what sentences are about: thus an explanation of why
Scott died is not necessarily an explanation of why the
author of Waverley died." 11 But if explanation is
"geared to sentences or propositions", then explanation
provides no motivation for accepting events beyond the fact
that some of the sentences with which explanation is con-
cerned are true and involve commitment to events. But
then explanation provides no special motivation for ac-
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cepting events
.
Since I am unfamiliar with Chisholm's views on ex-
planation, I do not know if he is faced with similar dif-
ficulties. However, since events for him are proposition-
like, it is likely that he is not subject to the same sort
of criticism.
Another kind of motivation for events is that there
must be events in order to give an account of causation.
Kim says, as we saw in Chapter I, that events are the
1 A
relata of the relation of causation. And in "Causal
Relations" Davidson tries hard to show that causation is a
relation holding between events. Chisholm, too, believes
I C
that some events cause others. One might wonder whether
the same sort of objection that was made against Kim and
Davidson's appeal to explanation as a motivation for ac-
cepting events can be made against their appeal to caus-
ation. After all, we saw in Section 3 of Chapter IV that
Davidson thinks that ’caused* sometimes functions as an
sentential connective or as an operator on statements
,
16perhaps better expressed by the words 'causally explains'.
If causation turns out to be a relation between statements,
then it would seem to provide little support for thinking
that there are events. But, of course, Davidson does not
think that causation is a relation between statements -
it is an relation between events. Rather, Davidson thinks
that in some sentences the word 'cause' does not express
this relation, but instead expresses a relation which holds
between statements.
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Another sort of motivation for thinking that there
are events, urged by both Kim and Davidson, is that events
are needed to state the mind-brain Identity Theory. Kim
says that "the Identity Theory asserts that pain is identical
with brain state B ." 17 a few sentences later he says that
to claim that pain is identical with brain state B is to
claim, among other things, that the two statements 'Plato
is in pain (at time t) ' and 'Plato is in brain state B
(at time t) ' describe or refer to the same event or
1
8
state." if this is what the Identity Theory says, then,
of course, it is true, there are events. The Identity Theory
is a matter of dispute, however, and so any appeal to it to
establish that there are events would seem to be weak.
The fact that the theory is disputed might, nevertheless,
be of interest. For most of the disputants do not chal-
lenge the meaningfulness of the theory, and even those who
deny the truth of the theory do not do so on the ground
that there are no events. This suggests that those phil-
osophers who discuss the Identity Theory uniformly agree
that there are events. This fact might provide some
evidence for thinking that there are events, but it is
surely only meager evidence.
Davidson makes a different, but related, claim. He
says that not merely the truth, but the intelligibility
19
of the Identity Theory requires that there be events.
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But this does not seem to be right. Suppose that the
central claim of the Identity Theory can be put as 'All
mental events are identical with physical events'. Surely
this claim would be intelligible even if there were no
events. We could imagine two misguided biologists dis-
agreeing over whether all yellow alligators are 20-
chromosomed alligators. Even though there are no yellow
alligators nor 20
-chromosomed ones, let us suppose, the
disputed claim is still intelligible. Perhaps, however,
Davidson meant to assert instead that the central claim of
the Identity Theory is non-vaccuous
.
' If the Identity
Theory is non-vaccuous or non-trivial, then whether it is
true or false
,
it would seem to follow that there are
events
. This consideration would have to be worked out
in greater detail to be really convincing, but it is, I
believe, a promising line of argument.
A final consideration in favor of an ontology of
events is suggested by Davidson's remark that "it is hard
to imagine a satisfactory theory of action if we cannot
talk literally of the same action under different des-
20cnptions
.
" And he adds that "this talk of descriptions
and redescriptions makes sense, it would seem, only on the
assumption that there are bona fide entities to be des-
cnbed and redescribed." Davidson's claim gets its
force, presumably, on the assumption that if there are
actions, they are events, and so if there are actions,
there are events. I think that this latter claim is
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correct, although I am not sure how convincing Davidson's
claim is, that a satisfactory theory of actions requires
that we be able to describe and redescribe the same action.
But the question of what is to count as a satisfactory
theory of action is a question that is beyond the scope of
this work
.
We have listed eight reasons for thinking that there
are events. One I found weak, namely, that events are
needed to account for adverbial modification. Another,
that events are needed for explanation, is puzzling;
Kim and Davidson, who make the claim, turn out to hold
views about explanation and events that make it difficult
to see how events are related to explanation. Four
reasons, (i) that we have definite descriptions purporting
to denote events, more generally, (ii) that we have
singular terms which purport to refer to events and which
come equipped with what looks like the whole apparatus of
reference, (iii) that we need events to give a theory of
action, and (iv) that the non-triviality of the Identity
Theory shows that there are events, seem to be right,
but by themselves they are likely to be unconvincing. Two
reasons seem to me to be promising. First, events are
needed to give the semantics of sentences like
(1) John's kicking the door startled me.
Second, events are needed to give an account of causation,
. 22
since the relation of causation holds between events.
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Although none of the philosophers we considered advanced
the first of these as a reason in favor of events, it is
clear that they would all be sympathetic to it. For, Kim,
Davidson, and Chisholm all regard phrases like 'John's
kicking the door' as referring to events. It is also
clear that they all regard the second reason as persu-
asive. Kim and Davidson have even attempted to state
causal theories in terms of their theories of events. 23
Showing exactly how these considerations establish that
there are events, if indeed they do, would presumably
require having an acceptable theory of causation and an
acceptable semantics for English in hand. Of course,
investigating these areas is beyond the scope of this
work. I turn instead to a consideration of problems
which any adequate theory of events ought to provide
answers to.
2. Problems . An adequate theory of events ought to
answer
,
I think
,
the question of whether there are both
particular and generic events. Why is this question
important? I think it is important because an adequate
theory of events should be useful in stating a theory of
24causation. But, as Kim has emphasized, causation, con-
strued on a Humean model, seems to require both generic
and particular events . Central to a Humean account of
causation are the requirements that causes and effects
be constantly conjoined and that they be spatially and
temporally contigious. If particular events occur only
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once, it makes no non-trivial sense to say that they are
constantly conjoined. So the requirement of constant
conjunction seems to require generic events: every instance
of generic event A is followed by an instance of generic ev-
ent B. On the other hand, spatial-temporal contiguity seems
better explained in terms of particular events, since they
seem more readily locatable. So it seems as though a
theory of events ought to embrace both generic and parti-
cular events, or otherwise explain how a theory of causation
can be stated with only one or the other.
As a matter of fact, the three theories we have ex-
amined each have an answer to this question. Kim is the
most straight'-forward. For Kim, events are particulars.
But those properties the exemplifying of which by a thing
at a time is an event are generic events. Thus, according
to Kim, each particular event has a generic event built
in.
For Davidson events are particular. While he does not
deny that there are in addition generic events
,
he ap-
parently does not feel a need for them. 25 How can
Davidson state the principle of constant conjunction?
1 think he would do so as follows : if an event e causes
an event f then there is a predicate 'F* true of e and a
predicate * G ' true of f such that all F-events are followed
by G-events and all G-events are preceded by F-events. 25
There may be a difficulty in deciding exactly which pre-
dicates non-trivially support causal generalizations, but
160
there seems to be no reason in principle that would prevent
the condition of constant conjunction from being stated
in some such way as the above.
On Chisholm's view events are generic. And while he
does not deny that there are particular events, he thinks
that we can do without them, in the sense that we can
reduce talk which seems to be about particular events to
talk just of the occurrence and non-occurence of generic
events. How than can Chisholm explain the spatial-temporal
contiguity of causes and effects? Well, (generic) events
may occur at different times and at different places, and
it is particular occurrences of events which cause parti-
cular occurrences of other events. If a particular oc-
currence of an event £ causes a particular occurrence of
an event g_, then those occurrences of £ and q are spatially
and temporally contigious
. Of course, on Chisholm's theory,
there are strictly no such things as particular occurrences
of events. But if he can successfully eliminate talk of
particular occurrences of events in terms of the occur-
rence or non-occurrence of events, then the way I just
stated the principle of spatial-temporal contiguity can be
purged of any references to particular occurrences. I am
not sure that Chisholm can carry out this enterprise, but
if he can, he would not be barred on this account from
• • 2 7giving a theory of causation.
A second problem which any theory of events ought to
161
solve is whether there is recurrence, and if there is not,
what we mean when we say that a certain event occurred
yesterday and the same event occurred again today.
Chisholm's theory is designed to accommodate recurrence.
Kim and Davidson must say that, literally, there is no
such thing. Kim can give a round-about account of some
kinds of recurrence. For example, if someone were to
suggest that John's sleeping recurred, Kim could say that
there are times t
± ,
1
2 ,
and t_
3
cuch that t is earlier than
t
2
and t
2
is earlier than t
3
and that [(John,^), sleeps]
exists, [(John, t_
3 ) ,
sleeps] exists, but [(John, t
2 ) ,
sleeps] does not exist. What literally recurs on this
account is John's sleeping sometime, but that, for Kim,
is not an event. And if someone were to suggest that
there being a Republican President recurs, Kim can say
that there exist distinct people x and y and times t^
and t_
2
such that [ (x, t^) , is a Republican President] and
[Y , t 2 ) , is a Republican President] both exist. In this
case what literally recurs is someone's being a Republican
President, and again, that is not, on Kim's view, an event.
Davidson considers the following example of recurrence
"last night I dropped a saucer of mud, and tonight I did it
again (exactly the same thing happened) . " He tries to
account for two occurrences of his dropping a saucer of mud
solely in terms of particular events. He suggests that
"the sum of all my droppings of saucers of mud is a par-
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ticular event, one of whose parts (which was a dropping
of a saucer of mud by me) occurred last night; another such
part occurred tonight. We need three events to carry this
off, but they have the same ontological status .” 29 Sup-
pose that Davidson only dropped a saucer of mud twice. It
is not clear how his suggestion can make literal sense of
the claim that there is one event, namely, Davidson's
dropping a saucer of mud, and it occurred exactly twice.
It will not do to say that there are exactly two events
which are Davidson's dropping a saucer of mud, for that
does not say that there is an event that occurred twice.
Nor will it do to say that there is an event, namely, the
sum of Davidson's droppings of a saucer of mud, that has
exactly two parts. For in the first place, it is not
clear that anything has exactly two parts. If Davidson's
individual droppings of a saucer of mud had parts, are
not those parts also parts of the sum-event consisting of
the two droppings? Perhaps there is something involved in
the process of forming sum-events which ensures that the
only parts sum-events have are the particular events in
which they consist, but Davidson has said nothing to suggest
this. But even if clear sense could be made of the sug-
gestion that there are exactly two parts to the sum of
Davidson's droppings of a saucer of mud, this would not
treat literally that his dropping a saucer of mud occurred
twice. But if this claim is not to be taken literally,
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then Davidson might just as easily say that he dropped a
saucer of mud twice. This latter statement does not re-
quire any events other than particular events for its
analysis. This is in fact a line that Davidson takes, or
\
comes close to taking, in a later paper. ^ Thus, if
Davidson accepts as literal claims that there are events
that recur, then he seems to be unable to explain re-
currence. If, however, he could show that such claims
need not be taken literally, then he need not be trouble
to try to expalin recurrence.
A third problem for any adequate theory of events is
that it ought to make sense of our ordinary intuitions
about how events are individuated. It would be unreason-
able of course, to think that a philosophical theory ought
to mesh perfectly with our pre-analytic intuitions. For
one thing, our intuitions are not always that clear. But
it is certain that we do not ordinarily conceive of events
as so fine-grained as Kim and Chisholm do. I also think,
though perhaps this is not as clear, that we do not ordin-
arily conceive of events as so coarse-grained as Davidson
does
.
First, let us consider the fine-grained approach.
Consider some event, say, Washington's crossing the
31Delaware. None of Kim's events is identical with that
event, since it seems to be the case that none of Kim's
events could have occurred at any time other than the
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txme at which they did occur. But, of course, Washington's
crossing the Delaware could have taken a little longer.
Also, intuitively, Washington's crossing the Delaware was
the same event as the man who would become the first
President crossing the Delaware. And it was the same
event as Washington’s crossing the Delaware on Christmas
night. But according to Chisholm, those events which are
Washington's crossing the Delaware, the man who would
become the first President crossing the Delaware, and
Washington crossing the Delaware on Christmas night, are
all distinct. So none of them is that event which we
would ordinarily have in mind when we speak of Washington's
crossing the Delaware.
It seems as though the theories of events given by
Kim and Chisholm do not have to do with the things we or-
dinarily think of as events
,
things like examinations
,
battles
,
weddings
,
football games
,
and births
,
or blessed
events. Perhaps this is of no consequence. But if they do
really mean to give a theory of events, then if the entities
they describe are not what we ordinarily think of as events,
then they at least owe us an explanation of how our ordin-
ary events are related to their preferred entities. One
possibility is that our ordinary events might somehow be
constructed out of the preferred entities of Kim's or
32Chisholm's theory. But as of now we have no idea how
that might be done.
165
While Kim and Chisholm present theories with an abund-
ance of events, Davidson's theory seems not to have enough.
Judith Thomson notes that there is a moderate view between
Davidson’s view on the one hand and views like Kim's and
Chisholm's on the other.
^
But there is, between them, a "middle ground",
according to which we may not identify a replenish-ing with a pumping, but may, and indeed should,identify a replenishing with a replenishing bypumping, and that with a replenishing with a pump;
according to which we may not identify a killing with
a shooting with a pressing of a trigger, but may,
and indeed should, identify a killing with a killingby shooting, and that with a killing with a gun; and
so on.
If the view sketched by Thomson reflects our preanalytic
view of events, and I suspect that it does, then Davidson,
too, has to explain how the entities he prefers are re-
lated to our ordinary events. Where Kim and Chisholm face
the task of event construction, Davidson seems faced with
the task of event dismantling. I would guess that the
latter enterprise is at least as formidable as the former.
A final problem for any theory of events is to explain
how sentences that are somehow about events are in fact
related to events. Let us call sentences like
(8) John sang at 3:00 P.M.
which "report" an event, 'event sentences'. A point made
35convincingly by Davidson is that event sentences usually
contain no singular term referring to an event. Yet (8)
is somehow intimately connected to an event, namely, an
(the) event of John's singing at 3:00 P.M. A central
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problem for a theory of events would seem to be to spell
out exactly how event sentences are related to the events
they report. It will be a useful review of the three
theories we have considered if we briefly consider the
solutions they suggest to this problem.
For Kim an event is a structure consisting in the
having of a property (or relation) 36 by an object (or
sequence of objects) at a time. Kim would understand
(8) as attributing a property to an object at a time, and
he would therefore take it as describing the event which
is the having of that property by that object at that
time. That is, according to Kim, (8) describes that
event denoted by the following technical expression:
(8k) [(John, 3:00 P.M.), Sings].
What (8k) denotes is the having of the property singing
by John at 3:00 P.M. And, in general, a sentence des-
cribes an event just in case it attributes a property to
a thing, or a relation to a sequence of things, at a time.
According to Davidson an event is a concrete particular.
Although (8)
,
if understood to mean a particular 3:00
P.M., could not report more than one event, a sentence
like 'John sang yesterday* could be true even though John
sang many times yesterday. For this reason Davidson takes
event sentences to be existential generalizations over
events. Thus, he would analyse (8) as
(8d) (Ex) (Sang (John
,
x) & At(3:00 P.M., x ) )
.
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Adverbial expressions (or at least some of them) are
treated as predicates of events. For Davidson, then, an
event sentence asserts the existence of at least one event
of a certain sort, the sort to be determined by the con-
ditions of the sentence.
According to Chisholm, an event is a state of affairs
which can occur, can not occur, and can recur, that is,
occur again after not occurring. I am not sure that
Chisholm's theory yields an unambiguous way of under-
standing (8)
.
Certain remarks of his 37 suggest that he
would understand (8) as
(8c) That event which is John's singing occurred at
3:00 P.M.
Alternatively, Chisholm's theory may by taken to treat (8)
as
(8c“) That event which is John's singing at 3:00 P.M.
occurred
.
I am not sure whether (8c) or (8c') has advantages the
3 8other lacks. We might note that (8c) and (8c') entail
each other; so whenever one is true, the other is, as well.
We should also note that they say different things. What
(8c) says is that John's singing occurred at 3:00 P.M.;
while (8c') says of John's singing at 3:00 P.M. that it
occurred. If John's singing is distinct from John's
singing at 3:00 P.M., then (8c) and (8c') predicate dis-
tinct properties of distinct entities. But on Chisholm's
view, John's singing is^ distinct from John's singing at
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3:00 P.M. For
,
the latter can occur whenever John sings,
but the former can occur only when John sings at 3:00 P.M.
Despite the uncertainty over whether Chisholm takes
(8) as (8c) or as (8c 1 ) , we can state a general claim of
his theory: an event sentence expresses a certain state of
affairs, and the sentence is true just in case the state of
affairs occurs. Our question over (8c) and (8c') is not
a question about this general claim. Rather, it is a
question as to what state of affairs (8) expresses.
What I have tried to do in this chapter is, first,
to cull from the writings of Kim, Davidson, and Chisholm,
some reasons for taking events seriously. And while not
all of their reasons were convincing, I think that at least
some are credible. Thus, there is, it seems to me, good
reason for trying to give a philosophical theory of events.
Secondly, I have listed four problems which a theory
of events ought to solve. The three theories we considered
are sophisticated enough to have readily available answers
3 8for three of these problems. The fourth, that of re-
lating a philosophical theory of events to our ordinary
intuitions about events, seems to be less amenable to
straightforward treatment on any of the three theories
considered. Thus, in addition to the particular criticisms
of the three theories made in previous chapters , the lack
of a solution to this problem is a further criticism.
I think that it is clear that none of the theories we
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considered is at present acceptable. Whether any of them
\
can be revised or elaborated so as to meet these critic-
isms remains to be seen. I have tried to evaluate these
theories largely on the basis of clarity, internal con-
sistency, and correspondence with intuition. It may yet
turn out, however, that the final test for a theory of
events is fruitfulness, that is, usefulness in stating
other philosophical theories, most notably, theories of
causation or of the semantics of English sentences
.
But that is another topic.
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’’Events and Their Descriptions: Some Considerations"
in Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel
,
198-215, p. 204.
5
"The Individuation of Events" 218.
6 ,letter to Fred Feldman, June 14, 1973; also, seminar
at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, spring, 1973.
7For helping me to appreciate the importance of this
point I am indebted to Terence Parsons
.
8
op . cit .
9
"Causation, Nomic Subsumption, and the Concept of
Event" Journal of Philosophy 70 (1973) : 217-236.
10
"Events and their Descriptions" 210.
11 letter to the author, February 22, 1974.
12
"Causal Relations" Journal of Philosophy 63 (1967) :
691-703, p. 703.
^"The Individuation of Events" 22 3.
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14Cf. "Events and Their Descriptions" 204.
15 loc. cit .
16 See his "Causal Relations" 702.
17
"On the Psycho-Physical Identity Theory" American
Philosophical Quarterly 3 (1966) : 227-235, p. 231.
18 Ibid
.
19
"The Individuation of Events" 218.
2Q Ibid . 217.
21 Ibid. 218.
^^This remark should not be taken as implying that the
relation of causation holds only between events. It might,
for example, hold between agents and events.
23For Kim see "Causation, Nomic Subsumption, and the
Concept of Event",” for Davidson see "Causal Relations".
2
^"Causation, Nomic Subsumption, and the Concept of
Event" 217.
25
"Eternal vs. Ephemeral Events" 335.
^ 6
Cf. "Causal Relations" 699f.
27Attempts to state clearly the difference between
particular and generic events have convinced me that the
distinction is not as easily drawn as one might initially
suppose. I have been led to speak of events as either
particular or generic because the philosophers we have
considered have used these terms. It might turn out,
however, that no clear sense can be given to the dis-
tinction. Should that happen, the first problem for any
theory of events should be replaced by the following
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related claim: an adequate theory of events ought to be
a theory of those entities between which the relation of
causation typically obtains.
2 8
"Events and Propositions" Nous 4 (1970): 25-32, p. 27.
29
Ibid
. 28.
30
"Eternal vs. Ephemeral Events" 338f.
31 ...Let us suppose
,
despite history, that Washington's
crossing the Delaware on the night of December 25, 1776,
was his only crossing.
32 This possibility is suggested by Kim, "On the Psycho-
Physical Identity Theory" 232, note 8.
33Thomson is actually concerned to trace a view between
Davidson's view and Goldman's view. Goldman's theory is
quite close to Kim's, and it is similar to Chisholm's
theory in the respect that is relevant here, that is, it
sees events as fine-grained.
34
"Individuating Actions" Journal of Philosophy 68
(1971) : 774-781, p. 780 .
35 See, for example, "Causal Relations"; also "The
Logical Form of Action Sentences" in N. Rescher, ed.
,
The
Logic of Decision and Action (Pittsburgh, 1966) : 81-95.
36
I shall not here review the restrictions Kim places
on the sorts of properties and relations the having of which
by a thing or sequence of things is an event. See Chapter
I, Sections 1 and 3.
^"States of Affairs Again" 185.
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3 8
Although, what I said in the last two paragraphs of
Chapter V, Section 6, suggests that taking (8) as (8c')
would be preferable to taking it as (8c).
39
This is not to suggest that their answers are all
acceptable. I am merely suggesting that the theories each
have the resources to try to state answers to these problems.
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